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RAPISTS, SEXUAL OFFENDERS, AND CHILD 
MOLESTERS:  WHO IS YOUR ROMANTIC 
“MATCH”?  WHY DATING WEBSITES 
SHOULD PERFORM CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a hardworking, career-driven woman named Sam. 1  Sam’s 
busy life occupies her spare time, so she joins an online dating website in 
hopes of finding her significant other.  After Sam spends endless hours 
creating a profile, the dating website recommends some possible dates 
based on Sam’s answers.  Eventually Sam encounters the profile of 
someone interesting, and the two decide to go on a date.  On the night of 
her date, Sam expected to meet someone special; but, instead her date 
simply bides his time until he eventually sexually assaults and rapes 
Sam before leaving her in a dark alley.2  Following this ordeal, Sam 
investigates her recommended date and discovers previous rape 
convictions.  She wonders how the dating website recommended such a 
dangerous person.  Although the prosecutor will hold Sam’s date 
criminally responsible, the dating website could protect Sam from that 
harm; therefore, the law should allow Sam an opportunity to hold the 
dating website responsible for failing to protect her. 
Dating websites can help prevent this situation by performing 
criminal background checks on users, but the websites will likely escape 
liability for failing to perform criminal background checks.3  If states 
required dating websites to perform criminal background checks, 
situations like the one described may not occur, or in the alternative, if a 
website failed to perform criminal background checks, then it would face 
liability for its conduct.4  However, without statutory guidelines, no duty 
requires dating websites to perform criminal background checks.5  As a 
result, victims cannot hold dating websites accountable for failing to 
perform criminal background checks.6 
                                                 
1 This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author.  
2 See infra note 28 and accompanying text (listing criminal attacks on dating website 
users by their dates).  
3 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), and its 
grant of immunity to websites from tort actions). 
4 See infra Part III.C.1 (analyzing how performing criminal background checks may 
affect dating website users online). 
5 See infra Part III.B.2 (assessing that, without CDA immunity, current statutes do not 
impose a duty on online dating websites to perform criminal background checks). 
6 See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing that the CDA immunizes online dating websites from a 
negligence cause of action). 
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This Note builds upon the proposals of other notes that 
recommended amendments to the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”) and proposes that every state adopt legislation that requires 
online dating websites to perform criminal background checks and 
notify users of the results for their recommended dates.7  First, Part II 
explains how online dating websites operate, provides an overview of 
current state statutes affecting online dating websites, discusses the 
history of the CDA and how the CDA grants immunity to websites from 
negligence causes of action, and considers the cost and effectiveness of 
criminal background checks.8  Second, Part III analyzes the current safety 
procedures designed to protect dating website users, the CDA and its 
effect on website immunity, and the effects of requiring dating websites 
to perform criminal background checks.9  Finally, Part IV proposes a 
model state statute that requires online dating websites to perform 
criminal background checks on users and notify users of their 
recommended date’s criminal history.10 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The popularity of online dating websites increased substantially in 
recent years, which increased the number of dates recommended by 
dating websites.11  However, despite their popularity, no laws require 
dating websites to increase their security measures by performing 
criminal background checks before recommending a user as a potential 
date.12  Part II.A gives an overview of the growth of online dating 
websites and the current requirements and risks involved with using an 
online dating website.13  Part II.B lists state statutes affecting dating 
                                                 
7 See infra note 98 (discussing proposals of amendments to the CDA that would reduce 
the amount of immunity granted to websites from tort claims); infra Part IV (proposing a 
model state statute that would impose a legal duty on online dating websites to perform 
criminal background checks). 
8 See infra Part II (providing an overview of online dating websites, statutes affecting 
dating websites, the CDA, common causes of actions brought by victims, and criminal 
background checks).  
9 See infra Part III (analyzing current safety methods instituted to protect dating website 
users, the fairness of granting CDA immunity to websites, and whether criminal 
background checks will increase the safety of online dating and remain an economically 
feasible solution for dating websites). 
10 See infra Part IV (proposing that each state pass legislation requiring that online dating 
websites perform criminal background checks on users). 
11 See infra Part II.A (noting the growth of dating websites in recent years). 
12 See infra Part II.B (listing statutes that affect dating websites and range from regulating 
user contracts to warning users about the lack of criminal background checks). 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the popularity of online dating websites and the 
procedures and risks involved with using an online dating website). 
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websites and explains their impact on user contracts and the dating 
websites’ security measures.14  Part II.C explains section 230 of the CDA 
and the evolution of the Internet since the CDA’s enactment.15  Part II.D 
discusses tort liability by explaining common actions filed against online 
dating and social networking websites, and highlights CDA decisions 
granting immunity from negligence actions.16  Last, Part II.E discusses 
the requirements, economics, and effectiveness of criminal background 
checks.17 
A. Online Dating Websites 
Industry leader Match.com launched its website in 1995 and helped 
turn online dating into a global service.18  However, in the United States 
alone, approximately 1500 active dating websites serve millions of 
users.19  The increase in popularity allowed the industry to double in size 
from 2007 to 2012 in both the number of people—twenty million in 2007 
to forty million in 2012—and value—$900 million in 2007 to $1.9 billion 
in 2012.20  Although some websites offer free basic memberships, the 
                                                 
14 See infra Part II.B (highlighting current state statutes affecting online dating websites). 
15 See infra Part II.C (explaining the history of the CDA and the evolution of Internet 
use). 
16 See infra Part II.D (listing the elements of common tort actions filed against social 
websites and explaining cases interpreting CDA immunity). 
17 See infra Part II.E (explaining the use of criminal background checks to screen for 
dangerous individuals). 
18 About Us, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/help/aboutus.aspx?lid=4 (last 
visited June 9, 2013).  Match.com serves twenty-four countries and territories throughout 
the world in fifteen different languages.  Id.  Another popular dating website, eHarmony, 
started in 2000 and provides its services throughout the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and the United Kingdom.  Company Overview, EHARMONY, http://www.eharmony.com/ 
about/eharmony/ (last visited June 9, 2013).  Although not popular in America, China’s 
top dating website serves millions of users.  See Online Matchmaking Flourishes in China, 
CHINA DAILY (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-01/02/content_ 
27565451.htm  (discussing the large number of single young adults in China and how they 
turn to dating websites when under pressure by their parents to get married).  Jiayuan.com, 
a popular Chinese dating website, serves over seventy-three million users and each day 
about seven thousand individuals change their relationship status to “in a relationship” or 
“married.”  Id. 
19 Kristin Marino, The Logic of Online Lovin’:  Does Online Dating Work?, 
MBAPROGRAMS.ORG (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.mbaprograms.org/news/does-online-
dating-work.html.  The highest number of visitors per month belong to ZOOSK with over 
fifty million in 2007, PlentyOfFish with thirty-two million in 2011, Match.com with twenty-
nine million in 2012, and eHarmony with twenty million.  Id. 
20 Id.  Online dating developed into a very profitable industry:  IAC, owner of 
Match.com and its affiliate websites, reported revenues of $105.2 million in the fourth 
quarter of 2011, ZOOSK reported revenues over $90 million annually, and even niche 
dating services are cashing in as Spark Networks, owner of the niche service Christian 
Mingle, reported revenue of $12.7 million in the third quarter of 2011.  Id.  Although the 
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most popular sites—Match.com and eHarmony—charge fees ranging 
from $36 to $60 a month, respectively.21  Many dating websites require 
users to complete a compatibility test allowing the site to recommend 
and match users based on answers to specific questions.22  Dating 
websites may ask users to provide basic background information 
including:  (1) age; (2) gender; (3) education; (4) profession; (5) family 
size; and (6) religion.23  Some sites, such as eHarmony, may also ask 
users for more in-depth information including:  (1) hobbies; (2) drinking 
                                                                                                             
industry substantially expanded in recent years, four companies control 77% of the market.  
Anne VanderMey, Outsourcing the Algorithm of Love to Online Dating, CNNMONEY (Feb. 14, 
2013, 7:02 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/02/14/outsourcing-the-algorithm-of-
love/.  IAC, owner of Match.com and OkCupid.com, controls 41% of the market, 
eHarmony controls 23.5% of the market, Zoosk represents 7.7% of the market, and Spark 
Networks, owner of JDate, Christian Mingle, and many other niche websites, serves 4.9% of 
the market.  Id.  Additionally, new forms of revenue have developed as websites turn to 
mobile apps to increase revenue.  Sharon Jayson, Mobile Apps Tap the Changing Face of 
Online Dating, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2013/02/13/online-dating-mobile-apps/1902011/.  The mobile dating market 
grew to almost $213 million in 2012, and analysts expect the mobile dating market to nearly 
double within five years.  Id.  Currently, popular dating websites provide the app for free 
but require users to pay subscription fees to access their online profile information via the 
mobile app.  Id. 
21 Quentin Fottrell, 10 Things Dating Sites Won’t Tell You:  The Risks and Rewards of Looking 
for Love Online, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 11, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://articles.market 
watch.com/2013-02-11/finance/36988343_1_match-com-okcupid-online-personals-watch.  
However, both Match.com and eHarmony offer discounted rates for a six-month bundle.  
Id. 
22 See Here’s How Chemistry Works for You, CHEMISTRY.COM, 
http://www.chemistry.com/tour (last visited June 9, 2013) (requiring users to take a 
personality test and to receive personalized matches based on the test); PLENTYOFFISH, 
http://www.pof.com (last visited June 9, 2013) (matching users based on a “Chemistry 
Test”); Scientific Match Making, EHARMONY, http://www.eharmony.com/why/science-of-
compatibility/ (last visited June 9, 2013) (recognizing that the compatibility matching 
system takes into account twenty-nine compatibility dimensions to predict a user’s possible 
relationship success). 
23 The Perils and Pitfalls of Online Dating:  How to Protect Yourself, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs37-online-dating.htm (last updated 
May 2013).  Additionally, dating websites may retain the information after an individual 
deletes his or her account.  See Robert L. Mitchell, Online Dating:  Your Profile’s Long, Scary 
Shelf Life, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 13, 2009, 12:00 PM), https://www.computerworld. 
com/s/article/9127799/Online_dating_Your_profile_s_long_scary_shelf_life (explaining 
the length of time that dating websites retain user information after the user deletes the 
profile).  True.com retains user information indefinitely, and eHarmony archives user 
information but does not delete a user from the database.  Id.   Alternatively, PlentyOfFish 
deletes “records after six months to a year of inactivity.”  Id.  Dating website eHarmony 
retains user information because many users return to the service after inactivity and 
retaining the information prevents users from filling out the several hundred profile 
questions again.  Id.  However, dating websites also retain the information because 
companies find it valuable for marketing purposes.  Id. 
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behavior; (3) sexual preferences; and (4) income.24  Although websites 
use this information to recommend specific users as potential dates, most 
websites fail to perform criminal background checks to screen for users 
with past sexual assault or violent crime convictions.25 
Additionally, online dating websites’ terms of use waive the 
website’s liability for any damages arising from the conduct of the user 
or anyone else in connection with using the service.26  To help users 
avoid dangerous situations arising from online dating, websites provide 
safety tips as guidelines for a safe and successful experience.27  However, 
                                                 
24 The Perils and Pitfalls of Online Dating:  How to Protect Yourself, supra note 23.  Although 
users expect their online contacts to view their information, third parties may access the 
information as well.  See Social Networking Privacy:  How to be Safe, Secure and Social, PRIVACY 
RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/social-networking-privacy#access 
(last updated May 2013) (explaining who may access user profile information posted on 
social networking sites).  Users expect their contacts on social networking sites to access 
their information; however, additional parties including (1) advertisers, (2) software 
developers, (3) identity thieves, and (4) other online criminals, may access information with 
legal or illegal motives.  Id.  Furthermore, users should provide accurate information 
because litigation increasingly involves the use of dating website profile information.  
Dating Website Info Being Used in Divorces, UPI.COM (Feb. 17, 2013, 11:02 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/02/17/Dating-website-info-being-used-in-
divorces/UPI-73261361160121/?spt=hs&or=tn.  A survey polling top divorce attorneys 
discovered 59% of the attorneys noticed an increase in the use of dating website 
information during divorce proceedings.  Id.  Most commonly parties use information 
relating to an individual’s relationship status.  Id.  In addition, attorneys use information 
about a party’s salary, occupation, and parental status to show deceit or lack of honesty.  Id. 
25 See Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/ 
registration/membagr.aspx?lid=4 (last revised May 16, 2013) (warning users that 
Match.com does not perform criminal background checks); PlentyOfFish Terms of Use 
Agreement, PLENTYOFFISH, http://www.pof.com/terms.aspx (last updated May 31, 2013) 
(stating that PlentyOfFish does not perform criminal background checks); Terms of Service, 
EHARMONY, http://www.eharmony.com/about/terms/ (last visited June 9, 2013) 
(explaining that eHarmony does not perform criminal background checks on users).  But 
see About True, TRUE, http://www.true.com/about.htm?svw=homepage (last visited June 
9, 2013) (screening all communicating members through the largest criminal records 
databases online). 
26 See, e.g., Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 25; PlentyOfFish Terms of Use 
Agreement, supra note 25; Terms of Service, supra note 25. 
27 See, e.g., Good Advice–Safety Tips to Follow, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/ 
help/safetytips.aspx?lid=4 (last visited June 9, 2013) (warning users to protect their 
finances and online information, to get to know someone before meeting in person, and to 
provide their own transportation to and from the date); Safety Tips, EHARMONY, 
http://www.eharmony.com/safe-online-dating/ (last visited June 9, 2013) (warning users 
to research and screen their dates, to choose a public place for initial dates, and to tell 
family or friends about their plans).  Reports suggest 62% of dating website users research 
their dates before meeting in person, and among 18- to 24-year-olds the percentage 
increases to 71%.  Match-Making Sites Making Blind Dating a ‘History’, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 
24, 2012, 1:02 PM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-24/computing/ 
34707223_1_blind-date-first-date-match-com. 
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providing users with online and offline dating safety tips has failed to 
prevent criminal attacks.28  In 2011, a California woman alleged her date, 
whom she met on Match.com, sexually assaulted her after a second date, 
and the woman’s attorney stated that the man had six prior convictions 
for sexual battery.29  Although online dating creates an environment for 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., KC Kelly, Wade Ridley Assaults Match.com Date, Mary Kay Beckman:  Online 
Dating Safety Tips, EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/ 
article/wade-ridley-assaults-match-com-date-mary-kay-beckman-online-dating-safety-tips 
(explaining how Wade Ridley stabbed and beat his online date after she ended their 
relationship); Ryan Raiche, Experts:  Emotions and Feelings Can Lead to Poor Decisions When 
Involved in an Online Romance, ABC ACTION NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/local_news/experts-emotions-and-feelings-
can-lead-to-poor-decisions-when-involved-in-an-online-romance (discussing the attack and 
robbery of Joseph Bruno by his online date Bobbie Jo Curtis and her son and friend); see also 
Jessica S. Groppe, Comment, A Child’s Playground or a Predator’s Hunting Ground?—How to 
Protect Children on Internet Social Networking Sites, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 215, 227–28 
(2007) (highlighting the risks involved with children using social networks and discussing 
how predators may take advantage of children online).  But see Lawrence G. Walters, 
Shooting the Messenger:  An Analysis of Theories of Criminal Liability Used Against Adult-
Themed Online Service Providers, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 211–12 (2012) (arguing that 
websites should be granted immunity from the actions of criminals using websites to 
further criminal activity).  However, beyond criminal attacks, dating website users also 
succumb to financial scams.  See Fottrell, supra note 21 (noting that dating website users 
suffered large financial losses by online scams).  Reports state users lost $50 million in 2011 
from romance scams with the average victim losing nearly $9000.  Id. 
29  Chris Sedens, Woman Sues Match.com After Alleged Sex Assault by Man She Met Online, 
CBS L.A. (Apr. 14, 2011, 7:37 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/04/14/woman-
sues-match-com-after-sex-assault-by-man-she-met-online/.  The woman sued Match.com 
and requested the site implement a sexual predator screening process.  Id.  For additional 
instances of women being sexually assaulted by their online dates, see Richard Alleyne, 
Personal Trainer Raped, Beat and Robbed Secretary He Met on Dating Website, TELEGRAPH (May 
25, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9290437/Personal-trainer-
raped-beat-and-robbed-secretary-he-met-on-dating-website.html, reporting the rape and 
assualt of a woman by an online date from PlentyOfFish.com, and Jason Meisner, Online 
Dates Led to Rape, Police Say PR Executive Charged with Assaulting Women He Met Through 
Dating Website, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2011, http://www.articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-
10/news/ct-met-online-assault-west-suburban-woman-website, discussing how Ignacio 
Carrillo sexually assaulted two women he met through an online dating website.  Violence 
against women predominately occurs from the actions of an intimate partner.  Wendy 
Pollack, Teen Dating Violence and the Subtle (and Not So Subtle) Blaming of Victims, SHRIVER 
BRIEF (Feb. 25, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2013/02/articles/ 
womens-law-and-policy/teen-dating-violence-and-the-subtle-and-not-so-subtle-blaming-
of-victims/ (indicating that the biggest threat of sexual violence to women may result from 
their romantic partner).  In 2009, 79% of reported rapes and sexual assaults against women 
were committed by a person the victim knew, and 41% of the attacks were committed by a 
current or former partner.  Id.  Estimates indicate that over 50 million people each year 
suffer some form of sexual or intimate partner violence.  Wendy Pollack, Increasing Sexual 
Violence Is a Serious Public Health Issue, SHRIVER BRIEF (Feb. 6, 2012, 1:45 PM), 
http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2012/02/articles/womens-law-and-policy/increasing-
sexual-violence-is-a-serious-public-health-issue/.  Additionally, it is estimated 53.2 million 
women are raped in their lifetime.  Id. 
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dangerous criminal attacks to occur, most states only regulate how 
dating websites contract with users, rather than enacting statutes to 
reduce the probability of criminal attacks stemming from online dating.30 
B. State Statutes Affecting Online Dating Websites 
With the increase in dating website use and the potential dangers 
associated with online dating, states enacted statutes to protect users 
from harmful business practices and to warn users of potential dangers.31  
Part II.B.1 provides an overview of state statutes designed to protect 
users when contracting with dating websites.32  Part II.B.2 discusses state 
statutes enacted to improve user safety while utilizing dating websites.33 
1. Statutes Regulating Dating Website Contracts 
The majority of state statutes involving dating websites impose 
requirements on the websites when contracting with users.34  For 
example, states require dating websites to provide users with a copy of 
the contract and allow users three business days to rescind the contract.35  
                                                 
30  See infra Part II.B (examining the state statutes that govern dating websites). 
31 See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (listing state statutes that protect users from deceptive or poor 
business practices of dating websites and explaining state statutes that require websites to 
warn users about criminal background check usage). 
32  See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing state statutes that affect user contracts and billing 
practices with dating websites). 
33 See infra Part II.B.2 (providing an in-depth look into state statutes that require dating 
websites to notify users about whether the website performs criminal background checks 
and about the risks and dangers of criminal background checks). 
34  See Phyllis Coleman, Online Dating:  When “Mr. (Or Ms.) Right” Turns Out All Wrong, 
Sue the Service!, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 139, 144–57 (2011) (examining state statutes 
regulating dating websites); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7152 to -7154 (West, 
WestlawNext through legislation effective June 20, 2013 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st 
Leg.) (requiring websites to allow rescission within three business days, outlining the 
requirements for a contract, and recognizing prohibited contract provisions); CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 1694.1–.4 (West, WestlawNext current with urgency legislation through ch. 70 of 
2013 Reg. Sess.) (stating contracts are void if entered into based on fraudulent or 
misleading information and outlining other contractual provisions relating to cancellation, 
refunds, death, and relocation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-321 (West, WestlawNext 
current with Public Acts enrolled and approved by the Governor on or before June 1, 2013 
and effective on or before July 1, 2013) (requiring the website to provide a copy of the 
contract to the user). 
35 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7152 to -7153 (mandating that dating websites provide 
customers with a copy of their contract and allow users three business days to rescind the 
contract); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1694.2 (requiring that dating websites provide customers with a 
copy of their contract, include specific language regarding the cancellation policy in the 
contract, and provide customers a rescission period of three business days); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 42-321 (stating clients must receive a copy of their contract, the website must 
allow a rescission period of three business days, and the website must return client money 
O'Day: Rapists, Sexual Offenders, and Child Molesters:  Who is Your Roma
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
336 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
Additionally, some states protect users from fraudulent contracts or 
deceitful business practices by declaring those contracts void and 
unenforceable.36  Furthermore, some states limit the length of dating 
website contracts and the fees that a dating website may charge users.37  
Although these statutes protect users from fraudulent business practices, 
other statutes provide protection from criminal attacks.38 
                                                                                                             
within ten business days of a cancelled agreement); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/20 
(West, WestlawNext through P.A. 98-21 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (providing users with a 
rescission period of three business days); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 555A.2–A.3 (West, 
WestlawNext current with immediately effective legislation signed as of May 21, 2013 from 
the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (requiring dating websites to provide a copy of the contract and 
granting three business days for cancellations); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 394-c (McKinney, 
WestlawNext through L.2013, ch. 1 to 57 and 60 to 110) (mandating that referral services 
provide customers with a copy of the agreement, notify customers about a three business 
day cancellation policy, and limit contracts to two-year terms); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-
119 (West, WestlawNext through S.L. 2013-70 of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) 
(allowing customers three business days to cancel their contract and requiring companies 
to provide customers with a copy of the agreement); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.42–.43 
(West, WestlawNext through 2013 File 17 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)) (requiring that 
businesses provide customers with a copy of the contract and allow a rescission period of 
three business days); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-78-2(a) to (b)(1) (West, WestlawNext through 
chapter 491 of the Jan. 2012 session) (stating that customers must receive a copy of the 
contract and granting customers a cancellation period of three business days); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 100.175 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Wisconsin Act 19, published May 18, 
2013) (mandating that dating services provide contracts to customers, allow customers 
three business days to rescind, and return refunds within twenty-one days of cancellation). 
36 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1694.4(a)–(b), (e) (declaring contracts entered into on fraudulent 
or deceitful information void and also declaring a contract void if the buyer waives benefits 
imposed by the statute); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 615/40 (prohibiting contracts based on 
unfair practices and declaring those contracts “void and unenforceable”). 
37 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7154 (restricting a dating service’s contract to one year 
but allowing the service to provide customers with an option to renew for one year 
thereafter); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1694.2(d) (prohibiting contracts requiring customers to pay 
beyond two years from the date of the contract but allowing the contract to provide 
services extending up to three years from the date of the contract); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 615/30(a) (limiting contracts to two years with an option to renew for a period not to 
exceed one year); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 394-c (limiting the contract to two years, limiting 
fees to $1000, requiring sellers who charge more than $25 to provide a specific number of 
monthly referrals, and allowing buyers to cancel the contract and receive a refund if the 
service fails to meet the required number of referrals for two consecutive months); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-123(a) (limiting contract duration to three years); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 100.175(5)(a) (prohibiting contracts from requiring a buyer to pay more than $100 for 
dating services before the buyer receives the services, unless the seller establishes proof of 
financial responsibility). 
38 See infra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating how a few state statutes focus on protecting users 
from harmful or criminal users online). 
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2. Statutes Designed to Increase Online Dating Safety 
Rather than focusing on contracts or business practices, a few states 
enacted statutes specifically designed to provide awareness to users 
about the dangers of online dating.39  The statutes require a website to 
state whether it performs criminal background checks, identify whether 
it allows users with criminal backgrounds to use the site, and also 
mandates that websites warn users that criminal background checks fail 
to flag all dangerous individuals.40  Additionally, the statutes require 
dating sites to list and describe safety measures used to develop safer 
dating practices.41  The statutes address the effectiveness of criminal 
background checks, by warning users of the inadequacies of background 
checks, so users remain cautious when using a dating website.42  
                                                 
39 See Coleman, supra note 34, at 149 (recognizing the distinctions between New Jersey’s 
statute from other statutes regulating dating websites); see also, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 518/10 (requiring online dating services to notify users about safety awareness and 
criminal background checks); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 394-cc(2) (requiring dating websites to 
notify users about safety measures); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 106.006 (West, 
WestlawNext through Chapters effective immediately through Chapter 36 of the 2013 Reg. 
Sess. of the 83rd Leg.) (requiring dating websites to notify users about safety measures).  
New Jersey created a unique statute requiring dating websites to notify users about 
whether the site conducts criminal background checks.  Coleman, supra note 34, at 149.  
Kevin Ambler attempted to sponsor a similar statute in Florida, but failed four times.  
Diane C. Lade, The Sweetheart Swindle, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 31, 2008, at 1D, available 
at 2008 WLNR 6061176; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
popular dating websites that adopted policies similar to New Jersey’s statute and now 
notify users whether the site conducts criminal background checks). 
40 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 518/10(b)–(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-171 (West, 
WestlawNext through L.2013, c. 84 and J.R. No. 9); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 106.004(a)–.005(b).  The statutes work in tandem with current safety procedures used by 
dating websites to create awareness about the dangers of online dating.  See supra note 27 
(explaining how dating websites provide safety tips for successful online dating and 
recommend that all users proceed with caution).  However, opponents of New Jersey’s 
statute, including the Internet Alliance, believe the statute may increase the problem by 
creating “a false sense of security.”  See Lade, supra note 39 (discussing the Internet 
Alliance’s executive director’s concerns regarding the New Jersey statute and how it may 
affect user safety). 
41 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 518/10(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-171a; N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 394-cc2; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 106.006.  Additionally, the New Jersey 
statute provides examples of proper safety notifications including:  (1) recognizing that 
identity thieves may create false profiles; (2) using caution when communicating with and 
meeting a stranger; (3) refusing to provide other users with personal contact information 
beyond the scope of the site; and (4) notifying a third party when meeting with strangers, 
utilizing separate transportation, and meeting in a public place.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
171a. 
42 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-169 to -173 (requiring dating websites to notify users 
whether the website performs criminal background checks); see also Coleman, supra note 34, 
at 150 (explaining how the New Jersey statute responds to critics, who argue the 
notification will create a false sense of security).  Specifically, the New Jersey statute 
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Although states enacted statutes imposing duties on dating websites, 
courts interpreted the CDA as granting immunity to websites, including 
dating services, from tort and negligence actions.43 
C. The CDA and the Internet Evolution 
In 1996, Congress enacted the CDA to promote the development and 
preserve the free market of the Internet.44  Since the CDA’s enactment, 
the Internet evolved and now individuals utilize it for many daily 
tasks.45  Part II.C.1 explains the purpose of the CDA and provides a brief 
history of early CDA interpretations.46  Part II.C.2 notes the changes in 
the Internet since the CDA’s enactment and discusses how the Internet 
encompasses a large portion of society’s daily lives.47 
1. CDA History and Its Initial Application 
Congress designed section 230 of the CDA to allow websites to block 
and filter third-party content without incurring liability.48  To accomplish 
that goal, the CDA prevents courts from treating a provider or user of an 
Interactive Computer Service (“ICS”) as the publisher or speaker of 
                                                                                                             
requires dating websites that conduct criminal background checks to state:  (1) criminal 
background checks fail to flag all dangerous individuals; (2) users may rely too much on 
the belief that checks catch all dangerous individuals; (3) criminals may develop methods 
of circumventing the checks; (4) not all states make criminal records public; (5) states may 
update criminal records databases infrequently; (6) the checks only include publicly 
available convictions; and (7) domestic databases do not check foreign arrests and 
convictions.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-171d. 
43 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the CDA and how courts use the CDA to dismiss tort 
actions against websites). 
44 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (2006); see Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator 
Exon’s Communications Decency Act:  Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 
49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57–58 (1996) (providing an overview of the CDA and its legislative 
history). 
45 See infra Part II.C.2 (examining the Internet evolution and how society substantially 
increased its Internet usage since the CDA’s enactment). 
46 See infra Part II.C.1 (highlighting the CDA’s enactment and its initial application). 
47 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the evolution of the Internet and how it shapes much 
of our daily lives). 
48 See Cannon, supra note 44, at 53 (discussing Senator Exon’s motivation for sponsoring 
the CDA); Cara J. Ottenweller, Note, Cyberbullying:  The Interactive Playground Cries for a 
Clarification of the Communications Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (2007) 
(identifying that section 230(c)(3) grants certain eligible parties “immunity from civil 
liability for attempting to restrict objectionable material posted by third parties.”).   Senator 
Exon proclaimed the Internet grants children access to pornography; therefore, he 
proposed the CDA to regulate speech on the Internet.  Cannon, supra note 44, at 53. 
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information provided by another content provider.49  To do this, the 
CDA distinguishes between an ICS and an Information Content Provider 
(“ICP”) when granting immunity.50  Courts developed a three-prong test 
to determine whether a website deserves immunity under the CDA:  (1) 
whether the website qualifies as an ICS; (2) whether the action treats the 
defendant as the publisher or speaker of information for liability 
purposes; and (3) whether a third party provided the information.51  In 
1997, the Fourth Circuit decided the first case interpreting section 230 of 
the CDA.52 
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), someone anonymously 
posted on an AOL message board an advertisement to purchase 
“Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts” after the Oklahoma City bombing and 
instructed purchasers to call Ken Zeran at his home phone number.53  
Zeran sued AOL and claimed a duty existed to remove the posting, 
notify users the messages were false, and screen more effectively for 
                                                 
49 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Trenton E. Gray, Comment, Internet Dating Websites:  A Refuge 
for Internet Fraud, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 389, 397 (2011) (distinguishing between an ICS 
and an ICP under the CDA); KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, “Minor” Online Sexual 
Harassment and the CDA § 230 Defense:  New Directions for Internet Service Provider Liability, 
32 HAMLINE L. REV. 207, 232–34 (2009) (explaining the intent behind the CDA and how the 
CDA allows ICS’s to filter third-party content without incurring liability for the content). 
50  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)–(3) (defining an ICS as a service or system that allows multiple 
users to access the Internet and defining an ICP as a person or entity responsible for 
creating or developing information provided through the Internet or other ICS).  An ICS is 
granted immunity under the CDA while an ICP is not granted immunity.  Id. § 230(c)(2); see 
Gray, supra note 49, at 397 (explaining the distinction between an ICS and ICP by 
demonstrating that the CDA grants immunity to an ICS for third-party actions but does not 
similarly grant immunity to an ICP).  See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Civil Liability of 
Internet Dating Services, 48 A.L.R.6th 351 (2009) (overviewing the different possible causes 
of action users may bring against internet dating websites). 
51 See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels:  An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 373, 412 (2010) (providing the elements used by courts to determine immunity under 
the CDA).  However, the Ninth Circuit may have created an additional fourth prong based 
on whether the defendant promised to remove content yet failed to do so.  Id.; see Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1107–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (adding a possible fourth prong based 
on the website’s promise, but failure, to remove posted content). 
52 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); see Bradford J. Sayler, 
Comment, Amplifying Illegality:  Using the Exception to CDA Immunity Carved Out by Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com to Combat Abusive Editing 
Tactics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203, 210–12 (2008) (discussing Zeran v. AOL and its broad 
grant of immunity). 
53 129 F.3d at 329.  See generally Patricia Spiccia, Note, The Best Things in Life are Not Free:  
Why Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decent Act Should Be Earned and Not 
Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369 (2013) (discussing the decision in Zeran).  Zeran 
received many calls where individuals left angry messages including death threats.  Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 329.  Zeran called AOL requesting that AOL remove the posts, however AOL 
refused to issue a retraction declaring the posting a hoax.  Id. 
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defamatory material.54  In response, AOL raised section 230 of the CDA 
as an affirmative defense.55  The court granted AOL immunity under the 
CDA because AOL qualified as an ICS and Zeran attempted to hold AOL 
liable as a publisher of information from a third party.56  Following 
Zeran, courts relied on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning to grant immunity 
to websites in a broad range of cases.57  Although many courts continue 
to rely on Zeran when determining CDA immunity, the Internet has 
evolved dramatically since the Zeran decision.58 
                                                 
54 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329–30. 
55 Id. at 330; see Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service 
Providers:  How Zeran v. America Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 583, 585–87, 594 (2008) (explaining the Zeran opinion, discussing how Zeran 
created a three-part test for section 230 immunity, and arguing that the Zeran approach best 
serves web 2.0 by granting broad immunity). 
56 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33.  Zeran argued AOL was liable as a distributor because AOL 
knew of the defamatory postings; but, the court failed to find a distinction between 
publishers and distributors of information.  Id. at 331–32.  Many courts rely on the Zeran 
Court’s reasoning and ultimately grant broad immunity under the CDA.  See, e.g., Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting immunity to social networking 
website MySpace); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(expanding the CDA by granting immunity to a dating website).  See generally Ziniti, supra 
note 55 (arguing that Zeran’s broad grant of immunity best serves the current state of the 
Internet). 
57  See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st Cir. 
2007) (finding Lycos, Inc. immune under the CDA in an action involving defamatory 
postings by third parties on a Lycos, Inc. message board); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 
656, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding GTE immune, as an ISP, when it displayed images of 
athletes while in the locker room setting, without the athletes knowing of the recording); 
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 716 (Ct. App. 2002) (barring a negligence action 
against eBay because the content provided was created by third parties).  However, some 
courts decided not to grant immunity, thus creating exceptions to the Zeran reasoning.  See, 
e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009) (deciding not to grant 
immunity to Accusearch Inc. under the CDA from a suit for selling personal data that 
included telephone records); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (choosing not to grant immunity 
to Roommates.com, after holding Roommates.com was an ICP because the site’s activity 
involved asking potentially unlawful questions).  In Roommates.com, the website enabled 
users to search for roommates based on specific qualifications; however, the questionnaire 
provided by the website included questions about race, thus making the questionnaire 
potentially illegal under the Fair Housing Act.  Id. at 1164; see Jeffrey R. Doty, Comment, 
Inducement or Solicitation? Competing Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the 
Wake of Roommates.com, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 130–31 (2010) (providing an 
overview of the underlying illegality approach to determine whether a website may be 
immune under the CDA when the website contributes to or solicits illegal activity); Sayler, 
supra note 52, at 214 (proposing that courts apply Roommates.com’s reasoning to defamatory 
editing tactics); Rachel Seaton, Comment, All Claims Are Not Created Equal:  Challenging the 
Breadth of Immunity Granted by the Communications Decency Act, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 355, 
369–75 (2010) (discussing Roommates.com and its effect on CDA analysis). 
58 See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining how the Internet has changed since the CDA’s 
enactment). 
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2. The Internet Evolution 
When Congress enacted the CDA, it chose to protect the Internet 
more than the individuals using the Internet.59  However, Congress did 
not likely foresee the Internet boom and the infiltration of the Internet 
into much of our daily lives.60  In 1995, a year before the CDA’s 
enactment, the Internet user base consisted of less than 40 million people 
and less than 23,500 websites; however, in 2011, nearly 2 billion people 
accessed the Internet, which then consisted of nearly 300 million 
websites.61  Due to greater accessibility, people now use the Internet for 
information, shopping, education, communication, entertainment, and 
banking, among other uses.62  In addition to the Internet’s increased 
capabilities, smart phones allow people to access the Internet 
                                                 
59 Gray, supra note 49, at 398. 
60 See Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limits? Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on 
Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 122–23 (2012) (noting that Facebook reached 
750 million active users worldwide and 157 million users in the United States in July 2011); 
Suzanne Choney, 25 Percent Use Smartphones, Not Computers, for Majority of Web Surfing, 
NBC NEWS (July 11, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/25-percent-
use-smartphones-not-computers-majority-web-surfing-122259 (discussing that more 
people access the Internet on the go, rather than using a computer); Megan Gannon, Why 
Some Facebook Users Constantly Update Status, LIVESCIENCE (Jan. 3, 2013, 5:13 PM), 
http://www.livescience.com/25972-facebook-status-updates-loneliness.html (explaining 
how many people use Facebook constantly throughout the day); Donald Melanson, Amazon 
Announces Q4 2011 Results:  Sales Jump to $17.43 Billion, but Profits Drop 58 Percent, 
ENGADGET (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2012/01/31/amazon-
announces-q4-2011-results-sales-jump-to-17-43-billion/ (overviewing the amount of online 
sales on Amazon.com).  CDA litigation primarily revolves around ISPs that simply provide 
a message board for users to post comments.  See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (deciding CDA 
immunity for an ISP that provided message boards for users to interact with each other); 
Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1011–12 (Fla. 2001) (hearing a case regarding “chat 
rooms” and the application of the CDA). 
61 The Rather Petite Internet of 1995, PINGDOM (Mar. 31, 2011), http://royal. 
pingdom.com/2011/03/31/internet-1995/.  In 2011, the Internet user base was 50 times 
larger than in 1995, and the number of Facebook users was “15 times larger than the entire 
Internet was in 1995.”  Id.; see Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog:  A 
Proposal for Blogging, Employment-At-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 245, 250–51 (2007) (highlighting the increase in popularity of blogs by noting that web 
users create thousands of blogs daily and maintain millions of other blogs as well). 
62 See Hemangi Harankhedkar, Internet and Its Uses in Our Daily Life, BUZZLE (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://www.buzzle.com/articles/internet-and-its-uses-in-our-daily-life.html (listing 
how society uses the Internet for daily tasks); see also Gannon, supra note 60 (explaining that 
college students rely on Facebook for communication purposes); Melanson, supra note 60 
(discussing the growth in online shopping via Amazon).  Although the Internet provides 
many benefits, including the ability to connect across the globe with social networking, the 
increasing use of social networking sites poses new problems for the legal community.  See 
generally Emily M. Janoski-Haehlen, The Courts Are All a ‘Twitter’:  The Implications of Social 
Media Use in the Courts, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 43 (2011) (identifying problems raised by social 
networking sites for courts, judges, and attorneys). 
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anywhere.63  Furthermore, the Internet led to the creation of new 
industries supporting companies with large revenues and profits.64  
However, courts rely on reasoning from the 1990s when deciding and 
interpreting the CDA.65  Throughout the Internet evolution plaintiffs 
used tort actions in an attempt to hold dating websites accountable for 
their injuries.66 
D. Tort Actions Against Dating Websites 
Individuals attempting to sue an online dating or social networking 
website generally use one of three causes of action:  (1) negligence; (2) 
fraud; or (3) negligent misrepresentation.67  Most cases brought under 
these theories result in the court granting the website immunity under 
the CDA.68  Part II.D.1 reviews the necessary elements for negligence, 
                                                 
63 See Choney, supra note 60 (explaining the increase in people that use a smartphone to 
access the Internet rather than a computer); see also Brian Honigman, 100 Fascinating Social 
Media Statistics and Figures from 2012, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2012, 7:32 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-honigman/100-fascinating-social-me_b_2185281.h 
tml (providing statistics that illustrate the increase in mobile access to social networking 
sites).  Nearly 500 million users regularly access Facebook via their smartphone and 50% of 
Twitter users access Twitter via its mobile site.  Id. 
64 See Michael Berkens, IAC Reports Earnings:  Match.com Up 22%:  IAC Renews Search 
Deal with Google & Has $1.6 Billion in Cash, DOMAINS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.the 
domains.com/2011/04/26/iac-reports-earnings-match-com-up-22-iac-renews-search-deal-
with-google-has-1-6-billion-in-cash/ (overviewing Match.com’s increasing revenue and 
profits); Claire Cain Miller, Google Still in a Struggle with Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/technology/google-profit-exceeds-expectations.ht 
ml?_r=0 (noting Google’s billions in profit even though the company struggles with the 
emerging mobile market); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the 
growth and profitability of online dating). 
65  See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 252, 254, 
260 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying on Zeran to grant immunity to a website allowing buyers to 
comment on goods they purchased); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419–20 (5th Cir. 
2008) (using the Zeran court’s reasoning to grant MySpace immunity under the CDA); Doe 
II v. MySpace, Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 153–54, 159 (Ct. App. 2009) (granting immunity to 
MySpace based on the Zeran approach). 
66 See infra Part II.D (explaining the necessary elements of common law tort actions filed 
against dating websites and discussing negligence actions involving dating websites). 
67 See, e.g., Doe, 528 F.3d at 417 (identifying that plaintiffs filed a negligence claim and a 
gross negligence claim against MySpace); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 729 
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (discussing plaintiff’s fraud claim against a website), aff’d, 551 F.3d 412 
(6th Cir. 2008); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(reviewing plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims against Yahoo!), aff’d, 
376 F. App’x. 775 (9th Cir. 2010). 
68 See, e.g., Doe, 528 F.3d at 421 (barring all of plaintiff’s claims under the CDA); 
SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (granting SexSearch.com immunity under the CDA).  
But see Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1262–63 (finding that the CDA did not bar the fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation claims). 
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fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.69  Part II.D.2 discusses cases that 
involve interactive websites and the CDA.70 
1. Types of Tort Actions 
Negligence covers unreasonably risky behavior that causes harm.71  
To prove a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must establish five elements:  
(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) the 
defendant’s breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff; (3) an injury 
or loss sustained by the plaintiff; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate 
cause.72  A duty of care may exist under a reasonable care standard or 
through a statute designed to protect against a specific type of conduct.73  
                                                 
69 See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the required elements for negligence, fraud, and 
negligent misrepresentation). 
70 See infra Part II.D.2 (explaining court decisions interpreting CDA immunity for 
interactive websites). 
71 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (2d ed. 
2011) (defining the tort of negligence). 
72 See Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tenn. 2005) (listing the required elements for 
a negligence action); see also Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007) (listing four 
elements a plaintiff must prove for a negligence cause of action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 284 (1965) (defining negligent conduct as either “an act which the actor as a 
reasonable man should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion 
of an interest of another, or . . . a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or 
assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do”). 
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 7, 14 (2010) 
(recognizing that a person ordinarily maintains a duty to exercise reasonable care and that 
a person is negligent per se if they violate a statute created to protect against the particular 
accident caused by the actor’s conduct and if the statute protects a class of persons that 
includes the victim); see O’Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 122 P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho 2005) (defining 
the necessary elements of negligence per se); Chaffin v. Brame, 64 S.E.2d 276, 279 (N.C. 
1951) (expressing the reasonable care standard as “[w]hat would a reasonably prudent 
person have done under the circumstances as they presented themselves”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (explaining the reasonable care standard).  However, in 
some situations a duty of care may involve protecting people from the criminal acts of third 
parties.  Boren v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 939–40 (Ark. 1996).  Courts 
apply three tests to determine whether a duty exists to protect another from the criminal 
acts of third parties:  (1) the Specific Harm Test; (2) the Prior Similar Incidents Test; or (3) 
the Totality of the Circumstances Test.  Id. at 940–41.  The Specific Harm Test imposes a 
duty when the business owner knows or has reason to know of acts occurring or about to 
occur that pose an imminent probability of harm.  Id. at 940; see, e.g., Fuga v. Comerica 
Bank-Detroit, 509 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (applying the Specific Harm Test 
to an action brought by a plaintiff who was injured by a third party while using the 
defendant’s ATM); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975) (applying the 
Specific Harm Test in a negligence case that involved a female shopper who was assaulted 
in a parking lot).  The Prior Similar Incidents Test imposes a duty when a particular crime 
becomes foreseeable based on the similarity, frequency, location, and proximity of prior 
criminal acts.  Boren, 921 S.W.2d at 940–41; see Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26, 27 
(Ala. 1989) (finding two prior robberies insufficient to impose a duty and holding that a 
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An actor breaches a legal duty by accepting an unreasonable risk of 
foreseeable harm.74  The plaintiff must prove “the existence and amount 
of damages, based on actual harm of a legally recognized kind.”75  
Courts apply the “but for” test to determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct qualifies as a cause in fact.76  A defendant proximately causes 
the plaintiff’s injury when the harm occurs within a scope of risk created 
by the defendant’s conduct, and the defendant’s conduct makes the 
                                                                                                             
subsequent robbery was foreseeable); Golombek v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 598 
N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (App. Div. 1993) (holding two prior incidents were insufficient to impose 
a duty).  But see Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 48 (Colo. 1987) (holding ten armed 
robberies over three preceding years were sufficient to impose a duty); Nallan v. Helmsley-
Spear Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1980) (holding 107 prior crimes on the property were 
sufficient to establish a duty).  The Totality of the Circumstances Test imposes a duty when 
a crime becomes foreseeable based on all the circumstances including:  “the nature, 
condition, and location of the premises, in addition to any prior similar incidents.”  Boren, 
921 S.W.2d at 941.  Under this approach a duty may exist even without a prior criminal 
attack of the same nature.  See, e.g., Issacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 661–62 
(Cal. 1985) (imposing a duty on a hospital to protect patients from a doctor’s assault as a 
result of being shot in the parking lot); Torres v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 670 P.2d 230, 235–36 
(Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding a duty existed to protect customers from foreseeable dangers 
while making a night deposit at the bank).  For a discussion on tort liability for crimes 
committed by third parties at ATMs, see generally Chris A. Averitt, Note, Bank Not Liable 
for Attack on ATM Patron:  Boren v. Worthen National Bank of Arkansas, 50 ARK. L. REV. 521 
(1997) and Gregory W. Hoskins, Comment, Violent Crimes at ATMs:  Analysis of the Liability 
of Banks and the Regulation of Protective Measures, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 829 (1994). 
74 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 71, § 159 (“What is foreseeable depends in 
large part on what facts the defendant actually knew or those he should have known, 
based on his obligation to know and act as a reasonable person.”).  No breach occurs with 
an adequately useful risk.  Id. § 160.  A foreseeable harm exists if the actor knew of the risk 
or a reasonable person in a similar position would recognize the risk.  Id. § 159.  
Foreseeability alone fails to establish a breach of duty; the court must also weigh the 
probability that the conduct will inflict harm.  Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 
82 (Cal. 1997).  A court may determine whether a risk is reasonable through a structured 
approach by weighing the risk of harm and utility of the defendant’s conduct or by 
applying an unstructured balancing test weighing (1) the likelihood of the risk and (2) the 
amount of damage the risk will cause, against (3) the utility of the conduct and the cost of 
safety measures.  See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 71, § 160–61 (explaining the 
structured and unstructured approaches to determining reasonableness). 
75 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 71, § 124.  A legally recognized harm may be 
physical injury to person or property.  Id. 
76 Hale, 166 S.W.3d at 718.  Cause in fact does not mean sole cause; multiple causes in 
fact may exist.  Id.; see McDonnell v. McPartlin, 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1080 (Ill. 2000) (stating that 
multiple parties causing an injury does not qualify as a defense to a negligence action).  But 
see Guillot v. Sandoz, 497 So. 2d 753, 755–56 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a police 
department’s failure to suspend a license was not a cause in fact because a suspension does 
not prevent a driver from continuing to drive); Ambrosio v. Carter’s Shooting Ctr., Inc., 20 
S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that a gun store’s failure to exercise care in the 
storage and display of guns was not a cause in fact of the murder carried out with a gun 
stolen from the store because the connection was too attenuated). 
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harm foreseeable.77  Besides using negligence to hold websites 
accountable, individuals may also bring claims of misrepresentation 
against websites.78 
A plaintiff may sue for fraud, otherwise known as intentional 
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation.79  To establish a 
claim of fraud, a plaintiff must prove:  (1) a representation of material 
fact; (2) falsely made; (3) with knowledge of its falsity; (4) with intent to 
defraud; (5) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment; 
and (6) an injury proximately caused by the reliance.80  Similar to fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation requires:  (1) representation of a material 
fact; (2) falsity; (3) justifiable reliance; and (4) damages proximately 
caused by the reliance.81  Negligent misrepresentation replaces the intent 
and knowledge requirements with a proper relationship requirement.82  
Although some individuals allege claims of fraud and negligent 
                                                 
77 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 71, § 198 (“To prevail in a negligence action, 
the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the harm she suffered is within the 
defendant’s scope of liability . . . .”(footnote omitted)).  A defendant’s conduct does not 
qualify as a proximate cause if the harm is unforeseeable.  Id.  Multiple proximate causes 
may exist; therefore, multiple parties may sustain liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.  Id.  
However, a second actor or force may end the defendant’s liability as a superseding cause.  
Id.  The first actor’s liability ends with an unforeseeable second act.  Id.; see id. § 204 
(discussing the difference between an intervening cause and a superseding cause); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. b (2010) (defining 
intervening acts and superseding causes).  Generally, the criminal act of a third party that 
causes the harm, which was not intended or foreseeable by the original negligent actor, 
breaks the causal chain of the original act.  Annotation, Intervening Criminal Act as Breaking 
Causal Chain, 78 A.L.R. 471 (1932).  However, the actor may remain negligent if a 
foreseeable criminal act of a third party occurs and involves an unreasonable risk of harm.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965); see id. § 448 (defining when a criminal act 
fails to supersede a defendant’s prior negligent act); see also Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 
695 (Va. 1921) (stating that an actor remains liable when the alleged negligence exposes the 
injured party to the act causing the injury); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965) 
(stating that an actor may incur liability for third-party criminal acts if the likelihood that 
someone may act criminally makes the actor’s conduct negligent). 
78 See, e.g., Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 729 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (discussing 
plaintiff’s fraud claim against website and the required elements for fraud), aff’d, 551 F.3d 
412 (6th Cir. 2008); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(reviewing plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims against Yahoo!), aff’d, 
376 Fed. App’x. 775 (9th Cir. 2010). 
79 See Zitter, supra note 50, §§ 7, 20 (explaining the civil liability of online dating websites 
for actions involving negligent misrepresentation and fraud). 
80 See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 71, § 664 (listing the requirements for an 
intentional misrepresentation or fraud claim); see also Zitter, supra note 50, § 20 (citing Doe 
v. SexSearch.com for the proposition that an individual may sue a dating website for fraud). 
81 See MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT ET AL., LITIGATING BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL TORT 
CASES § 3:7 (2011) (explaining the requirements of negligent misrepresentation). 
82 See id. (recognizing that the requisite mental state differentiates fraud from negligent 
misrepresentation). 
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misrepresentation against online dating and social networking websites, 
this Note focuses solely on negligence actions.83 
2. CDA Immunity:  Social Networking and Online Dating Websites 
Some victims attacked as a result of using social networking sites 
have sued the websites in hopes of holding the websites accountable for 
their injuries.84  However, the courts—relying on the CDA—granted 
immunity to the websites.85  For example, in Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 
Inc., the Ninth Circuit held Matchmaker.com, an online dating website, 
immune under the CDA.86  Matchmaker.com allowed members to post 
profiles and view other members’ profiles in their area.87  An unknown 
person created a personal profile, imitating the plaintiff, which included 
lewd and sexual references.88  Carafano sued the website for negligence, 
                                                 
83 See infra Part II.D.2 (explaining court decisions granting immunity to websites in 
negligence actions). 
84 See infra note 85 (recognizing cases in which a plaintiff sued websites attempting to 
hold them accountable for their injuries). 
85 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting immunity 
under the CDA to a website faced with a negligence claim for failure to protect children 
from online predators); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969–70 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(holding Craigslist immune under the CDA because third parties provided the content); 
Doe IX v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (finding MySpace 
immune under the CDA because users provided the information posted in their profiles); 
Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298 (D.N.H. 2008) (holding an adult 
web community immune under the CDA because users provided the online personal ads). 
86 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).  But see Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 
1257, 1262–63 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (choosing not to grant immunity to a dating website from 
claims that it created fake profiles), aff’d, 376 Fed. App’x. 775 (9th Cir. 2010).  See generally 
Jeffrey Lipschutz, Case Note, Internet Dating . . . Not Much Protection Provided by the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 Based on Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 
(9th Cir. 2003), 23 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 225 (2004) (providing a case study of Carafano).  
Anthony’s claim that Yahoo! created fake profiles treated Yahoo! as an ICP because 
Anthony alleged Yahoo! created the content.  Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1262–63.  
However, the CDA failed to grant Yahoo! immunity because only ICS’s are treated as a 
publisher of third-party content and receive immunity, rather than content providers.  Id. 
87 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.  The profiles usually contained a few pictures, descriptive 
information about the member, and answers to questions that portrayed the member’s 
personality.  Id.  Matchmaker.com required members to complete a questionnaire with over 
fifty questions to fill the content of their profile.  Id.  Matchmaker.com created the 
questionnaire and provided answers users could select from when completing the 
questionnaire.  Lipschutz, supra note 86, at 227. 
88 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.  The profile indicated the member was looking for a one-
night stand and gave other indications of sexual behavior.  Id.  The profile also sent an 
email containing the plaintiff’s home address and telephone number to anyone that sent a 
message to the profile.  Id.  Matchmaker.com’s policy prohibited members from including 
last names, addresses, phone numbers, or other personal contact information within the 
profiles.  Lipschutz, supra note 86, at 228.  However, Matchmaker.com relied on users to 
report inappropriate profile information, and once informed, Matchmaker.com either 
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invasion of privacy, and defamation, but the court granted immunity to 
the website because third parties primarily provided the information.89  
The court granted Matchmaker.com immunity as an ICS because the 
profiles only existed or contained content once users created them, and a 
third party created the information within the relevant profile that led to 
the harm.90 
In addition to granting immunity to a dating website, the CDA 
allows social networking sites to claim immunity from tort actions.91  For 
instance, in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., a thirteen-year-old girl created a 
                                                                                                             
edited or deleted the profile.  Id.  The profile led to Carafano receiving obscene, sexually 
explicit communications and a fax threatening her son.  Id. at 229.  An unknown person in 
Europe created the profile on October 23, 1999.  Id. at 228.  Carafano later learned of the 
profile and notified police on November 5, 1999.  Id. at 229.  Carafano’s manager also 
notified Matchmaker.com on November 6, 1999, which caused Matchmaker.com to delete 
the profile on November 9, 1999.  Id. 
89 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122, 1125.  The court granted Matchmaker.com immunity 
because it “did not play a significant role in creating, developing, or ‘transforming’ the 
relevant information.”  Id. at 1125; see John E. D. Larkin, Criminal and Civil Liability for User 
Generated Content:  Craigslist, a Case Study, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 85, 107 (2010) (discussing 
how Matchmaker.com provided questions that users answered for dating matches, which 
resulted in Matchmaker.com’s ICP declaration). 
90 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124–25.  The court viewed Matchmaker.com as an ICS even 
though it provided questions to assist with completing the profile because third parties 
supplied the answers and users chose the content.  Id. at 1124; see Green v. Am. Online, 318 
F.3d 465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2003) (barring an argument for failure to protect a user because 
third parties provided the content); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714–16 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (barring a negligence claim against eBay due to the CDA because the content 
provided was created by third parties).  But see Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 
785, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying immunity under the CDA in an unlawful 
misappropriation action).  In Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., the court rejected Facebook’s CDA 
immunity argument because the plaintiffs claimed Facebook used information provided by 
users to create new content published as endorsements.  Id. at 801.  Although the court 
agreed with Facebook regarding its ICS status, the court relied on Roommates.com’s 
reasoning to define Facebook as both an ICS and ICP.  Id. at 801–02. 
91  See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting a website 
immunity under the CDA in a negligence claim for failure to protect children from online 
predators); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968–70 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding 
Craigslist immune under the CDA because the content is provided by third parties); Doe IX 
v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (finding MySpace immune under 
the CDA because users provide the information posted in their profiles); Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298 (D.N.H. 2008) (granting an adult web 
community immunity under the CDA because users provided the online personal ads).  
But see Matthew Altenberg, Comment, Playing the Mysterious Game of Online Love:  
Examining an Emerging Trend of Limiting § 230 Immunity of the Communications Decency Act 
and the Effects on E-Dating Websites, 32 PACE L. REV. 922, 948–51 (2012) (arguing that the 
current trend of courts makes a narrower application of the CDA possible, which may 
allow individuals to hold dating websites liable). 
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MySpace profile representing herself as eighteen years old.92  The profile 
allowed nineteen-year-old Pete Solis to contact Doe, and the two began 
communicating offline via telephone.93  However, once they met in 
person, Solis sexually assaulted Doe.94  Doe’s mother sued MySpace 
alleging it failed to utilize proper safety measures to prevent predators 
from contacting minors online.95  The Does filed claims for negligence, 
gross negligence, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation against 
MySpace.96  The court barred the claims via the CDA because the Does’ 
failure-to-protect argument merely rephrased a claim that attempted to 
hold MySpace liable for publishing third-party content.97 
                                                 
92 528 F.3d at 416.  MySpace admitted users fourteen or older, and the website 
automatically set the profiles of members under sixteen to “private,” limiting the 
information others could view.  Id.  See generally Sarah Merritt, Comment, Sex, Lies, and 
MySpace, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 593 (2008) (discussing the dangers of MySpace and how 
to prevent the sexual assaults and predators on the internet); Norby-Jahner, supra note 49, 
at 208–09 (explaining how predators sexually harass minors online and describing that 
victims share a limited legal remedy for their harm); Elizabeth P. Stedman, Comment, 
MySpace, but Whose Responsibility?  Liability of Social-Networking Websites When Offline Sexual 
Assault of Minors Follows Online Interaction, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 363 (2007) (assessing 
the liability of social networking websites when predators sexually assault minors offline). 
93 Doe, 528 F.3d at 416. 
94 Id.  Doe volunteered her phone number to communicate with Solis, and the sexual 
assault took place within one month of Solis’s initial online contact.  Id.  Following Doe v. 
MySpace, MySpace made agreements to increase online safety.  Chelsea Peters, Comment, 
MySpace or Yours?  The Impact of the MySpace-Attorneys General Agreement on Online 
Businesses, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 10, 2–6 (2008), available at digital.law. 
washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/424/1015_no2_art10.pdf?sequence 
=1 (discussing MySpace’s agreement regarding goals to improve online safety for minors).  
The agreement included four categories to improve safety:  (1) online safety tools; (2) 
design and functionality changes; (3) education for parents, educators, and children; and 
(4) law enforcement cooperation.  Id. 
95 Doe, 528 F.3d at 416; see Merritt, supra note 92, at 621–24 (suggesting Congress should 
create a national ID system for individuals to access the Internet to protect children online); 
Stedman, supra note 92, at 397 (suggesting that MySpace implement an age verification 
system by requiring credit cards to create a profile); see also Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal 
Implications of Social Networking, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 23–26 (2009) (discussing the 
dangers of sexual predators on social networking sites); Krista L. Blaisdell, Note, Protecting 
the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First Century:  Analyzing Computer and Internet Restrictions for 
Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1155, 1204–08 (2009) (proposing a model state 
statute that limits and restricts computer and Internet use for released sex offenders). 
96 Doe, 528 F.3d at 416. 
97 Id. at 419–20.  The court further characterized Doe’s argument as holding MySpace 
liable because Doe lied about her age, Doe disregarded MySpace’s safety 
recommendations, and the parents allowed Doe to create a profile; although, MySpace 
knew of the risk that users could lie.  Id. at 421–22.  Additionally, the district court rejected 
the argument, viewing it as “artful pleading,” to hold MySpace liable for publishing 
communications between Doe and Solis.  Id. at 419–20; see Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 
465, 469–70 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ failure-to-protect argument after re-
characterizing the claim as holding AOL liable for failing to screen third-party content).  In 
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Although courts continue to rely on the CDA to grant immunity to 
websites, many critics disagree with this policy and ultimately proposed 
solutions to reduce immunity.98  In addition, even though courts grant 
immunity to websites under the CDA, which prevents victims from 
holding websites accountable, criminal background checks may help 
reduce the number of attacks.99 
                                                                                                             
Green v. America Online, the plaintiff sued AOL after receiving a computer virus and 
receiving derogatory comments in a chat room.  Id.  The plaintiff based his failure-to-
protect argument on AOL’s Community Guidelines that outlined standards for online 
speech and conduct.  Id; see Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727–28 (N.D. Ohio 
2007) (granting immunity to the website when plaintiff claimed the website failed to 
prevent minors from using the site), aff’d, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).  In Doe v. 
SexSearch.com, SexSearch.com—an adult dating service—helped users connect for sexual 
encounters; however, Doe, a member of the service, connected with a minor via the website 
and eventually received criminal charges.  Id. at 722.  The court granted immunity, 
determining the plaintiff attempted to plead around the CDA to hold the website 
accountable for publishing the minor’s profile.  Id. at 727–28.  Although the court granted 
the website immunity from plaintiff’s tort claims, the court further held that the CDA 
grants immunity from all civil liability.  Id. 
98 See Gray, supra note 49, at 421 (suggesting an amendment to the CDA would prevent 
courts from granting online dating websites immunity for failing to protect their users from 
fraud); Lipschutz, supra note 86, at 241 (proposing a balancing test to determine CDA 
immunity); Norby-Jahner, supra note 49, at 259–60 (proposing an amendment to the CDA 
to create liability for social networking sites); Lisa Marie Ross, Note, Cyberspace:  The New 
Frontier for Housing Discrimination—An Analysis of the Conflict Between the Communications 
Decency Act and the Fair Housing Act, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 374–75 (2009) (amending the 
CDA to remove exceptions and incorporate a clause that limits the CDA’s application to 
instances included within the CDA’s text); Seaton, supra note 57, at 375 (suggesting a new 
test for CDA immunity that considers the collective effect of the ICS, the claim at issue, and 
the alleged facts of the case); Daniel Zharkovsky, Note, “If Man Will Strike, Strike Through 
the Mask”:  Striking Through Section 230 Defenses Using the Tort of Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 193, 231–32 (2010) (proposing the law 
should hold websites liable for their users’ torts of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); see also Ashley Ingber, Note, Cyber Crime Control:  Will Websites Ever Be Held 
Accountable for the Legal Activities They Profit From?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 423, 447 
(2012) (concluding the CDA may not grant websites immunity from criminal charges).  But 
see Walters, supra note 28, at 211–12 (claiming that websites should be granted immunity 
from claims involving a third-party criminal actor utilizing the website to perform criminal 
activity); Ryan French, Comment, Picking up the Pieces:  Finding Unity After the 
Communications Decency Act Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA. L. REV. 443, 485 (2012) 
(concluding that the Zeran approach of broad immunity best interprets the CDA and 
suggesting all courts adopt that reasoning to provide uniformity); Matthew Schruers, Note, 
The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 206–08 
(2002) (analyzing how the current state of the law provides the most economic efficiency 
for websites); Ziniti, supra note 55, at 594 (arguing that the Zeran approach to granting 
broad immunity is better than alternatives granting less immunity). 
99 See infra Part II.E (discussing criminal background checks and online dating). 
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E. Criminal Background Checks 
Criminal background checks allow someone to access an 
individual’s prior criminal convictions including felonies, 
misdemeanors, or other possible offenses.100  This section explains the 
scope, cost, and drawbacks of criminal background checks.101  Criminal 
background checks provide criminal records from federal, national, and 
county databases.102  Many providers offer a national criminal 
background check that includes records from all available databases.103  
The cost of a single criminal background check varies depending on the 
provider.104  Intelius offers a single national check for $39.95, Sentry Link 
offers a fifty-state check for $19.95, and U.S. Criminal Checks, Inc. offers 
a $12.95 nationwide check.105  Many providers also offer a volume or 
                                                 
100 See Criminal Records, INTELIUS, https://www.intelius.com/criminal-check.html (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2013) (stating a criminal report includes criminal convictions such as 
felonies, misdemeanors, and other criminal offenses); National Criminal Background Checks, 
CRIM. BACKGROUND RECS., http://www.criminalbackgroundrecords.com/national-
criminal-background-check.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (offering records for felonies, 
misdemeanors, and lesser criminal offense convictions and checks against the sex offender 
and most wanted lists); What Is and Isn’t Revealed Through a Background Check?, 
BACKGROUNDCHECK.ORG, http://www.backgroundcheck.org/basics/what-is-and-isnt-
revealed-through-a-background-check/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (discussing what 
someone may access via a criminal background check).  Additionally, depending on the 
scope of the search, the check may reveal arrest and incarceration records or outstanding 
warrants.  Id. 
101 See infra notes 102–11 and accompanying text (discussing the scope, expense, and 
inadequacies of criminal background checks). 
102 What Is and Isn’t Revealed Through a Background Check?, supra note 100.  
103 See, e.g., Criminal Records, supra note 100 (offering a single national background check); 
National Criminal Background Checks, supra note 100 (including records from federal, state, 
and county databases in the background check); Nationwide Criminal Background Searches, 
U.S. CRIMINAL CHECKS, INC., https://www.criminalcbs.com (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) 
(providing federal, state, and county records within one nationwide search).  But see 
National Criminal Background Check & Sex Offender Check, SENTRYLINK, 
http://www.sentrylink.com/web/loadCriminalReport.do (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) 
(failing to provide federal records within a national criminal background check). 
104 See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the prices associated with 
criminal background checks from various providers). 
105 Get the Information You Need on John Doe, INTELIUS, https://www.intelius.com (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2013) (search “People Search” for “John Doe”; then follow “Get the report 
on” for the first match) (pricing a single Intelius national criminal background check at 
$39.95); National Criminal Background Check & Sex Offender Check, supra note 103 (offering a 
fifty-state check for $19.95); Nationwide Criminal Background Searches, supra note 103 (selling 
a $12.95 nationwide criminal records check); see National Criminal Background Checks, supra 
note 100 (listing a $59.95 price for a single national criminal background check); see also 
Mandy Stadtmiller, Check Mate—More Women Paying to Investigate Dates; Before Dinner, a 
Background Check, N.Y. POST, Sept. 27, 2006, at 39, available at 2006 WLNR 16758576 
(discussing that people pay for criminal background checks before meeting someone from 
a dating website). 
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corporate discount, which generates a lower price per check for large 
orders.106  Although many websites offer criminal background checks, 
the online dating industry believes criminal background checks will not 
increase safety.107 
The dating website industry believes the cost of requiring criminal 
background checks outweighs the benefits.108  The industry also 
contends that requiring background checks will reduce the privacy of 
users and may reduce the amount of self-checking that users perform 
before meeting another user.109  Thus, industry leaders advocate for 
increasing the promotion of safety guidelines to improve safety, rather 
than relying on background checks that are not 100% accurate.110  
Although online dating websites oppose criminal background checks, 
other industries believe criminal background checks will provide safety 
benefits.111  Therefore, Part III analyzes whether requiring criminal 
background checks for dating websites will improve user safety.112 
                                                 
106 See Nationwide Criminal Background Searches, supra note 103 (allowing corporate 
accounts a discount); Search More & Pay Less with Volume Discount Packages, INTELIUS, 
https://www.intelius.com/salescontact.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2013) (offering a volume 
discount for large orders). 
107 See Ken Greenberg, In Wake of Major Security Breaches at Data Providers, Dating 
Site/Social Networking Trade Group Announces Opposition to State Legislation Aimed at 
Regulating Online Dating, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 21, 2005, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20050321005474/en/Wake-Major-Security-
Breaches-Data-Providers-Dating (discussing why dating websites oppose requiring 
criminal background checks). 
108 See id. (arguing that online users may screen their dates; therefore, meeting online is 
already safer than meeting someone at a bar).  For example, the industry believes criminal 
background checks will create a “false sense of security.”  Id.; see supra note 40 (discussing 
the Internet Alliance’s belief that criminal background checks will mistakenly provide 
users with an increased belief in user safety online).  But see Maureen Horcher, Comment, 
World Wide Web of Love, Lies, and Legislation:  Why Online Dating Websites Should Screen 
Members, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 251, 276–77 (2011) (arguing for federal 
legislation that requires fee-charging dating websites to perform criminal background 
checks on users). 
109 Greenberg, supra note 107 (outlining the comments of online dating industry leaders 
who oppose a criminal background check requirement).  But see supra note 27 (providing 
examples of the risks faced by users of online dating websites that fail to conduct criminal 
background checks). 
110 Greenberg, supra note 107 (stating industry leaders want to maintain the current safety 
measures).  Additionally, opponents of background checks suggest the solution will only 
provide substantial money to background check providers without solving the problem.  
Id.; see supra notes 27, 40–41 (explaining the safety measures that current dating websites 
suggest to prevent dangerous encounters and discussing how state statutes requiring that 
dating websites notify users whether they perform criminal background checks have 
added additional requirements to provide awareness about criminal background checks). 
111 See Jon E. Anderson & M. Scott LeBlanc, Skeletons in the Closet? Minimizing the Risks of 
Background Checking, 85 WIS. LAW., Sept. 2012, at 12, 12–13 (explaining how employers use 
background checks to identify dangerous job applicants and to verify the information 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Part III assesses the current state of the law regarding online dating 
websites and considers the impact that criminal background checks may 
have on the online dating industry.113  Part III.A examines current state 
statutes and analyzes how the statutes inadequately protect users.114  
Next, Part III.B evaluates the Internet’s evolution and proposes that the 
Internet’s increasing importance should alter how courts determine a 
website’s liability.115  Part III.B.1 assesses the strengths and weaknesses 
of the courts’ reliance on decisions dating back to the CDA’s origin.116  
Part III.B.2 analyzes current CDA immunity law and how it affects the 
users of online dating websites.117  Last, Part III.C demonstrates the 
effects and feasibility of implementing background checks into a dating 
website’s safety procedures.118 
A. State Statutes:  Assessing the Current Protections for Online Dating Users 
Aware of the dangers involved with online dating, states enacted 
statutes to regulate dating websites and protect users’ safety.119  The 
                                                                                                             
provided by the applicant); Barbara A. Lee, Who Are You? Fraudulent Credentials and 
Background Checks in Academe, 32 J.C. & U.L. 655, 656–57 (2006) (discussing the use of 
background checks for teachers, university faculty members, and other employees that 
work with children); To Curb Gun Violence, Enact Universal Background Checks, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 11, 2013, at 8A, available at 2013 WLNR 3409950 (suggesting mandatory background 
checks on gun purchasers to reduce gun violence). 
112 See infra Part III.C.1 (assessing whether criminal background checks will improve 
online daters’ safety). 
113 See infra Parts III.A, C (providing an overview of the effectiveness of current state 
statutes designed to protect dating website users and comparing the strengths and 
weaknesses of requiring dating websites to perform criminal background checks). 
114 See infra Part III.A (considering the current solutions states have implemented to 
protect users of online dating websites). 
115 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing how the impact of the Internet within society should 
force courts to revise their outlook on website liability). 
116 See infra Part III.B.1 (describing how courts should alter their decisions on CDA 
immunity to coincide with the Internet evolution). 
117 See infra Part III.B.2 (assessing the current state of CDA immunity decisions and how 
these decisions fail to provide relief for victims involved in criminal attacks stemming from 
online connections). 
118 See infra Part III.C (explaining how criminal background checks will increase the 
safety of using online dating websites and arguing that the online dating industry can 
financially withstand a requirement to perform criminal background checks on users). 
119 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7152 to -7154 (West, WestlawNext through 
legislation effective June 20, 2013 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 51st Leg.) (regulating how an 
online dating website may contract with its users); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-169 to -173 
(West, WestlawNext through L.2013, c. 84 and J.R. No. 9) (requiring dating websites to 
notify users whether the website performs criminal background checks); see supra Part II.B 
(discussing state statutes affecting online dating websites and users). 
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majority of the statutes solely affect the interactions between dating 
websites and their users; therefore, the statutes fail to protect users from 
other harmful, even criminal, individuals who use the dating websites.120  
Although some states designed their statutes to enhance the safety of 
users on dating websites, the statutes only bring awareness to the 
problem and fail to implement a solution.121  The statutes require dating 
websites to notify users whether the website conducts criminal 
background checks, which educates users about the possible dangers, 
but only increases safety through an individual’s own actions.122  
Furthermore, the major dating websites implemented notifications 
complying with New Jersey’s statute.123  Such notifications helped 
increase the users’ awareness about possible criminal attacks stemming 
from online dating, but failed to prevent or lessen recent attacks.124 
                                                 
120 See Coleman, supra note 34, at 144–57 (providing an overview of state statutes 
affecting dating websites and discussing how only New Jersey enacted a statute to protect 
users from dangers beyond dating services); see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1694.2 (West, 
WestlawNext current with urgency legislation through ch. 70 of 2013 Reg. Sess.) (requiring 
that dating websites:  (1) provide users with a copy of the contract; (2) institute specific 
statements regarding the cancellation of the user’s contract; and (3) implement a three 
business day rescission period for users to void the contract); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 394-c 
(McKinney, WestlawNext through L.2013, chapters 1 to 57 and 60 to 110) (limiting fees to 
$1000 annually, requiring sellers who charge more than $25 monthly to provide a set 
number of referrals per month, and allowing users to cancel their contract and receive a 
refund if the seller fails to provide the required number of referrals for two or more 
consecutive months). 
121 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-171 (mandating that dating services notify users:  (1) that 
one should take reasonable precautions to protect oneself when using the service; (2) that 
criminal background checks fail to screen all users; (3) that users should not believe in 
absolute security of criminal background checks; (4) that the service does or does not 
conduct criminal background checks; and (5) that the service does or does not allow 
members with known criminal backgrounds to join the website); see also Coleman, supra 
note 34, at 149–50 (reviewing arguments in favor of and against New Jersey’s statute that 
requires dating sites to notify users whether they conduct criminal background checks); 
Lade, supra note 39 (discussing Representative Kevin Ambler’s attempts to sponsor a 
similar statute in Florida).  Parties disfavoring criminal background checks believe such a 
requirement may create additional dangers by providing “a false sense of security.”  Id. 
122 Coleman, supra note 34, at 150 (discussing that individuals may follow safety tips 
provided by the website or conduct their own investigation of users to ensure their safety); 
see supra note 27 (overviewing the safety tips that major dating sites recommend users 
follow to ensure online dating safety). 
123 See supra note 25 (explaining how major dating sites Match.com and eHarmony notify 
users that neither site performs criminal background checks on users) 
124 See supra notes 28–29 (listing recent criminal attacks on users of dating websites by 
their referred date); see also supra note 27 (stating the safety precautions dating websites 
recommend to their users to increase safety). 
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In addition to complying with New Jersey’s statute, dating websites 
implemented their own safety measures.125  Dating websites recommend 
users follow dating safety tips to ensure safety online and safety when 
meeting someone new offline.126  Yet, similar to the New Jersey statute, 
the recommendations only improve safety through an individual’s own 
precautions.127  Furthermore, many women pay for criminal background 
checks on users before meeting them, rather than simply relying on the 
recommended safety precautions.128  In doing so, the users realize 
dangers exist and understand that solely relying on the dating website’s 
recommendations may not provide adequate security.129  Unfortunately, 
increased awareness about the possible dangers and recommended 
safety precautions failed to curtail attacks resulting from online dating.130  
However, victims also face an additional problem, current CDA law 
grants websites immunity from negligence claims.131 
B. Evolution of the Internet and CDA Immunity 
In recent years, the Internet has evolved to capsulate how 
individuals communicate, receive information, and perform many other 
daily tasks.132  However, courts continue to rely on case law that 
protected dating websites before the Internet evolution.133  Part III.B.1 
assesses whether courts should maintain their current line of reasoning 
regarding CDA immunity even though the Internet has evolved since the 
                                                 
125 See supra note 27 (discussing the safety recommendations that dating websites provide 
to users). 
126 See supra note 41 (listing the statute’s recommended safety measures including:  (1) 
notify a third party when meeting someone new; (2) meet in a public place; (3) provide 
your own transportation; and (4) refuse to provide personal contact information beyond 
the website profile). 
127 See supra note 41 (recognizing that an individual user must take affirmative steps to 
utilize these precautions); see also Stadtmiller, supra note 105 (explaining that many women 
pay for their own criminal background checks before meeting someone from a dating 
website). 
128 See Stadtmiller, supra note 105 (noticing the trend of users performing their own 
criminal background checks to improve their safety with online dating). 
129 See id. (pointing out that one private investigator believes dating website users lie 50% 
of the time, making criminal background checks necessary).   
130 See supra text accompanying note 124 (identifying that the notifications provided by 
dating websites did not decrease the number of attacks on users). 
131 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing why the current interpretation of CDA immunity fails 
to hold websites accountable for placing individuals into dangerous situations). 
132 See supra Part II.A (discussing the evolution of the internet and its influence on 
society’s daily lives). 
133 See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of cases decided under the purview of the 
CDA that have granted websites immunity from negligence claims). 
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CDA’s enactment.134  Part III.B.2 analyzes whether the CDA should 
provide victims of a criminal attack, stemming from online dating, an 
opportunity to hold the website accountable for the attack.135 
1. Outdated Precedent Guides CDA Court Decisions 
While the courts’ initial reasoning protected websites with unknown 
capabilities and potential, continuing to rely on outdated precedent 
unfairly protects large, successful businesses over individuals.136  
Therefore, rather than continuing to grant websites a broad range of 
immunity from tort claims, courts should treat websites similar to brick 
and mortar stores when deciding liability.137  Although treating websites 
similar to brick and mortar stores contradicts the original intent of the 
CDA, such reasoning provides victims with an opportunity to hold 
websites accountable for placing individuals into harmful situations 
involving possible criminal attacks.138 
                                                 
134 See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of current court 
decisions that invoke CDA immunity reasoning despite the increased use of the Internet). 
135 See infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that the CDA should impose liability on dating websites 
for failing to protect users from possible criminal attacks). 
136 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (using the CDA to hold 
MySpace—a successful social networking site—immune from a negligence action brought 
by a user); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (granting 
Craigslist immunity under the CDA from tort actions); supra notes 60–64 (discussing the 
growth of the internet and the increase in earnings and profits of large Internet-based 
companies); see also Horcher, supra note 108, at 266–68 (arguing that courts rely on outdated 
policy when upholding the CDA).  The current CDA policy fails to consider that the 
Internet provides numerous services and has evolved into a dominant channel for 
commerce.  Id. at 267. 
137 See supra note 73 (explaining the tests courts use to determine the liability of a store 
that places its customers into a dangerous situation).  Courts apply one of three tests to 
determine whether a duty exists to protect individuals or customers from the criminal acts 
of third parties.  Boren v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Ark. 1996); see 
supra note 73 (examining the factors and circumstances courts use when applying these 
tests and discussing cases where courts decided whether or not a legal duty existed). 
138 See Stedman, supra note 92, at 391–92 (arguing that social networking sites should face 
liability for failing to protect children from online predators).  Stedman’s solution requires 
MySpace to verify users’ ages through credit card numbers; therefore, parents know about 
their child’s account and may limit who their child may interact with online through age 
restrictions.  Id. at 397.  Stedman states MySpace’s failure to implement an age verification 
system was negligent and thus, courts should find MySpace liable for allowing children to 
interact with dangerous adults online.  Id. at 391–92; see Merritt, supra note 92, at 621–24 
(concluding that the current law prevents victims from holding MySpace liable when 
children interact with online predators and proposing an age verification system to protect 
children online). 
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Proponents of the CDA mistakenly believe that the courts’ current 
reasoning best supports how society uses the Internet today.139  
Supporters argue websites need immunity to continue to innovate 
because websites use information provided by third parties to create 
more value for users.140  However, proponents of the CDA argue this 
perspective only in regard to the posting of defamatory content, rather 
than assessing the impact that the current approach imposes on 
negligence claims against websites.141  Furthermore, the current scheme 
allows websites to provide more value because websites remain 
unaccountable for failing to protect their users from online and offline 
dangers.142  The current reasoning adopted by courts unfairly protects 
websites over victims; more specifically, the current reasoning unfairly 
                                                 
139 See Schruers, supra note 98, at 206–08 (arguing that the current state of the law 
provides the most economic efficiency for websites); Ziniti, supra note 55, at 594 (reasoning 
that limiting website immunity will destroy the significant value created by interactive 
websites).  But see Gray, supra note 49, at 426 (stating that the current law leaves the website 
immune from liability and the original culpable party fails to receive punishment); see, e.g., 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding the website immune; 
thus, preventing the victim from recovering damages).  In Zeran v. AOL, the original party 
responsible for posting the content never received due punishment.  Id. at 329. 
140 Ziniti, supra note 55, at 594 (stating websites that provide value through the content of 
others—including Wikipedia or Google—would significantly reduce the value they 
provide due to increased liability).  Ziniti assesses different alternatives to the Zeran 
approach and ultimately concludes that the benefits of the Zeran approach provides the 
best situation for search engines, traditional websites, content distributors, and content-
based advertising online.  Id. at 610–14; see Schruers, supra note 98, at 256–60 (claiming that 
a non-liability approach most efficiently regulates the economics of ISPs because liability 
fails to deter ISPs).  Schruers deems the tort behavior unavoidable; therefore, ISPs cannot 
prevent the torts and liability would not deter the ISPs.  Id. at 260.  But see Gray, supra note 
49, at 416–17 (arguing that protecting websites that allow third parties to post fraudulent 
information fails to spark innovation and suppresses fundamental rights). 
141 See Schruers, supra note 98, at 208 (reviewing the economic impact of different liability 
schemes regarding the monitoring of third-party content).  But see Seaton, supra note 57, at 
375–77 (arguing the current approach ineffectively determines liability and suggesting that 
courts should consider the nature of the ICS, the type of claim, and the facts alleged when 
determining liability).  See generally Ziniti, supra note 55 (assessing why the Zeran approach 
most effectively determines liability for websites that regulate third-party content).   
142 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting MySpace 
immunity from liability, even though the facts alleged that MySpace failed to protect minor 
users from adult predators); supra note 91 (discussing cases granting immunity under the 
CDA to websites for failing to protect their users from dangers online and offline); see also 
supra note 95 (listing proposed solutions to the CDA immunity problem that create 
methods for holding websites accountable for failing to protect their users).  Additionally, 
dating websites earn increased profits and increased sales; therefore, the industry can 
withstand increased liability.  See Gray, supra note 49, at 417 (providing that online dating 
websites can afford to monitor users due to their excessive profits). 
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affects the victims of criminal attacks stemming from an online dating 
website’s failure to perform a criminal background check.143 
2. CDA Immunity and Online Dating Websites 
Currently the CDA bars negligence actions against websites.144  This 
unfairly restricts victims from holding dating websites accountable for 
failing to perform criminal background checks on users.145  Someone 
attacked as a result of a dating website’s failure to perform criminal 
background checks may establish each element of a negligence claim 
except duty.146  Yet, courts grant immunity to websites before hearing the 
merits of a victim’s case.147  Therefore, the CDA denies a victim the 
opportunity to hold a website accountable for its actions even though a 
victim may establish four of the five required elements for negligence.148 
                                                 
143 See infra Part III.B.2 (assessing the impact of CDA immunity granted to websites in 
negligence actions that are brought against a dating website for failing to perform criminal 
background checks). 
144 See, e.g., Doe, 528 F.3d at 422 (holding MySpace immune under the CDA from a 
negligence cause of action); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(granting Craigslist immunity under the CDA from a negligence suit); Doe v. Friendfinder 
Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding a social networking website 
immune from a negligence claim); see also supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the CDA and 
decisions granting websites immunity thereunder). 
145 See Lipschutz, supra note 86, at 239 (stating the court decision in Carafano unfairly 
granted immunity to a dating website).  Lipschutz argues that the Carafano decision 
unfairly protects websites because the same action distributed through a book or television 
broadcast would create liability.  Id.  He further argues that Matchmaker.com was liable 
because the website charges users a fee and, as a business, maintains a duty to protect 
customers while using the service.  Id. at 240. 
146 See, e.g., Doe, 528 F.3d at 422 (dismissing a negligence claim against MySpace under 
the CDA without deciding whether MySpace negligently failed to protect the minor victim 
from sexual predators). 
147 See supra Part II.D (discussing the requirements and outcomes of tort actions brought 
against online dating and social networking websites); supra notes 85, 91 and 
accompanying text (illustrating that court decisions unfairly dismiss negligence actions 
against websites under the CDA before hearing any of the arguments on the merits).  See 
generally Zitter, supra note 50 (discussing cases where courts granted a defendant’s motion 
to dismiss because websites received immunity under the CDA). 
148 See Merritt, supra note 92, at 602 (stating victims without a widespread remedy need 
to sue to force change).  Merritt suggests parents need to sue MySpace for failing to protect 
their children online to receive compensation or to force MySpace to better protect their 
users online and offline.  Id.  But see Stedman, supra note 92, at 391–92 (concluding MySpace 
acted negligently by failing to protect children from online sexual predators).  Stedman 
contends that the CDA’s policy supports the determination that MySpace was not the 
proximate cause of the victim’s injuries.  Id. at 390 
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Additionally, by barring negligence suits, courts expanded the CDA 
beyond its original purpose.149  Congress enacted the CDA to allow 
websites to regulate third-party content posted on its pages without 
imposing liability for publishing information; however, court decisions 
expanded the CDA’s grant of immunity beyond its intended scope.150  In 
doing so, courts unfairly granted websites immunity in negligence 
actions when Congress did not intend for such a result.151  Courts 
misinterpreted the CDA and ultimately barred victims from holding 
websites accountable by granting websites immunity from negligence 
actions under the CDA.152  For a victim to ultimately succeed in a 
negligence suit and hold a website accountable for its actions, the law 
must impose a duty on dating websites to perform criminal background 
checks.153 
C. Criminal Background Checks and Dating Websites 
In recent years, criminal background checks became more effective, 
and now many employers and schools use checks to screen for possible 
dangers.154  However, dating websites fail to incorporate criminal 
background checks into their safety procedures to protect users.155  Part 
III.C.1 assesses whether criminal background checks will reduce the 
dangers associated with online dating.156  Part III.C.2 analyzes whether 
                                                 
149 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining Congress’s original intent for enacting the CDA); see 
also Cannon, supra note 44, at 52–53 (identifying the original purpose of the CDA was to 
limit the exposure of pornography to children on the Internet). 
150 See Ottenweller, supra note 48, at 1303–04 (discussing Congress’s original intent for 
passing the CDA); supra notes 90–91, 97 (explaining court decisions that granted immunity 
to websites for all tort claims rather than solely for claims regarding free speech on the 
Internet). 
151 See, e.g., Doe, 528 F.3d at 422 (granting a website immunity in a negligence action by 
invoking the CDA); see supra notes 90–91 (discussing instances where courts granted 
immunity under the CDA beyond the CDA’s original intended scope).  
152 See Ottenweller, supra note 48, at 1310–12 (arguing that courts misinterpreted the CDA 
and granted negligent websites “get out of jail free” cards). 
153 See infra Part III.C (analyzing whether requiring dating websites to perform criminal 
background checks will increase users’ safety and whether imposing a duty to perform 
criminal background checks will allow dating websites to remain profitable). 
154 See supra Part II.E (discussing criminal background checks and their increase in 
popularity to effectively screen for possible dangers). 
155 See supra Part II.A (reviewing the current safety methods and procedures dating 
websites use to protect or increase the safety of using their services). 
156 See infra Part III.C.1 (determining how effectively criminal background checks may 
screen for possible dangerous users of online dating websites). 
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dating websites can withstand the expense of performing criminal 
background checks on users.157 
1. Criminal Background Checks Will Reduce the Dangers of Online 
Dating 
Despite the possibility that criminal background checks may 
improve the safety of online dating, online dating websites fail to 
implement criminal background checks into their safety procedures.158  
Online criminal background checks contain nationwide records allowing 
checks of federal, state, and county criminal records; therefore, dating 
websites may efficiently determine—with one quick search—whether a 
user previously committed a dangerous crime.159  However, some 
drawbacks in implementing criminal background checks exist including:  
(1) the checks may not catch all users with criminal backgrounds; (2) the 
checks fail to flag predators without a prior conviction or arrest; and (3) 
many false profiles exist or predators may create false profiles to 
circumvent the background checks.160  Nevertheless, background checks 
will still flag some dangerous individuals online, which will help 
prevent possible dangerous encounters.161 
Additionally, opponents in favor of requiring that dating websites 
perform background checks believe mandating background checks will 
provide a false sense of security for users.162  Yet, the notifications 
provided to users, regarding their recommended date’s criminal 
background, may include warnings identifying the drawbacks of 
criminal background checks and recommending precautions daters 
should perform before meeting in person.163  Furthermore, by notifying 
                                                 
157 See infra Part III.C.2 (calculating the economic feasibility of requiring dating websites 
to perform criminal background checks on users). 
158 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (recognizing that dating websites 
recommend dating safety tips and techniques to increase a user’s safety but fail to take an 
active role in improving online dating safety outside of these advisory tips).  But see supra 
note 25 (identifying the only dating website to implement criminal background checks into 
its safety procedures). 
159 See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text (examining the depth of current online 
criminal background checks). 
160 Coleman, supra note 34, at 183 n.368 (discussing the limitations of requiring dating 
websites to perform criminal background checks on users). 
161 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (providing examples of attacks stemming 
from online dating that background checks may prevent). 
162 See supra note 40 (reviewing the claim that criminal background checks will grow the 
problem rather than act as a solution because users will develop a false sense of security). 
163 See supra note 27 (explaining the safety tips that dating websites provide to users).  
Currently, dating websites post safety tips within their terms of conditions or on separate 
pages that users may not view while utilizing the site.  Id.  However, by placing the dating 
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users of the drawbacks of background checks and providing safety tips 
along with the background check results, users will remain aware of the 
dangers involved with online dating and thus will not develop a false 
sense of security.164  Beyond the policy decision of whether criminal 
background checks will reduce or increase the safety of online dating, 
requiring criminal background checks poses another problem:  whether 
dating websites may remain profitable while implementing checks into 
their safety procedures.165 
2. Dating Websites May Withstand the Increased Cost of Criminal 
Background Checks 
Requiring dating websites to perform criminal background checks 
will pose economic challenges for the websites.166  However, increasing 
the volume of background checks performed will reduce the cost of 
online criminal background checks and make the requirement that 
dating websites perform background checks economically feasible.167  
For example, Intelius provides a national criminal records check for 
$39.95, but Intelius also advertises a volume discount, which dating 
websites may utilize by performing checks for each user.168  If a dating 
website requires each user to pay for the annual criminal records check, 
the dating website must increase each user’s monthly fee by $3.33 to 
break even.169  Although a $3.33 increase may dramatically reduce the 
                                                                                                             
tips within the notification for criminal background check results, the dating safety tips will 
be more accessible and users will view the tips more often, which in turn will reduce the 
alleged false sense of security.  See supra note 40 (providing an overview of the false sense 
of security that may result from criminal background checks). 
164 See supra note 40 (providing an overview of the false sense of security resulting from 
criminal background checks); see also Horcher, supra note 108, at 273–74 (questioning 
whether a false sense of security is worse than no security at all).  Additionally, users 
develop a false sense of security by using the website successfully even if the website does 
not perform criminal background checks on users.  Id. 
165 See infra Part III.C.2 (assessing the economic challenges of requiring dating websites to 
perform criminal background checks on users). 
166 See supra note 105 (indicating the cost of providing criminal background checks for 
users). 
167 See supra note 105 (identifying popular online criminal background check providers, 
and the current costs of performing one national check from each provider). 
168 See supra notes 100, 105 (stating the price of Intelius’s national criminal records check 
along with the information the check will provide); see also supra note 106 and 
accompanying text (providing the volume pricing for an Intelius background check). 
169 See supra notes 105–06 (examining Intelius’s costs and volume discount offering).  The 
price increase calculation relates to using Intelius as the provider and fails to include a 
likely volume discount.  See supra notes 105–06.  However, dating websites may choose 
cheaper alternatives instead of Intelius, opting for criminal background checks as low as 
$12.95.  See supra note 105 (listing the price of criminal background checks by Sentry Link 
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number of users of free online dating providers, the most popular dating 
websites charge $30 to $60 a month; therefore, a $3.33 increase in 
monthly fees seems reasonable.170  Furthermore, True.com requires its 
users to submit to a criminal background check and currently charges 
$50 a month, thus demonstrating the feasibility of performing criminal 
background checks on all users.171   
In sum, dating websites may perform criminal background checks 
while remaining economically viable, and these background checks will 
decrease the dangers of online dating.172  However, states do not 
currently require dating websites to perform criminal background 
checks.173  Therefore, Part IV proposes a model state statute mandating 
that dating websites perform criminal background checks on all users.174 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Although online dating is inherently risky—meeting someone in 
person for the first time—an online dating website should not receive 
immunity after placing someone in a dangerous situation by 
recommending a date with a convicted criminal.175  Under current law, 
online dating websites may avoid a negligence claim, for failure to 
perform criminal background checks, by claiming immunity under the 
CDA or arguing no duty exists to perform criminal background 
checks.176  Many proposals seek to amend the CDA by removing a 
                                                                                                             
or U.S. Criminal Checks).  By choosing a cheaper alternative with a volume discount, 
dating websites may limit the monthly increase to $1.00. 
170 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (comparing the monthly fees of popular 
online dating services). 
171 See supra note 25 (discussing that True.com utilizes criminal background checks to 
screen users but remains competitive with other dating services by only charging $50 a 
month); see also Horcher, supra note 108, at 271–72 (disclaiming that fee-charging dating 
websites cannot remain profitable when implementing background checks on users). 
172 See supra Part III.C (analyzing that criminal background checks will increase dating 
safety and not place a significant economic burden on dating websites). 
173 See supra Parts II.B, III.B (recognizing that states do not require dating websites to 
perform criminal background checks on users and instead courts grant websites immunity 
under the CDA). 
174 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a state statute that requires dating websites to perform 
criminal background checks and notify users of each recommended date’s criminal 
history). 
175 See supra note 28 (discussing situations where online dating websites recommended 
users with criminal convictions to other users). 
176 See supra Part III.B (analyzing why the CDA grants immunity to online websites from 
negligence claims and recognizing that an online dating website does not have a duty to 
perform criminal background checks on users). 
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website’s immunity from negligence claims.177  However, an amendment 
to the CDA only solves part of the problem because it only removes the 
immunity but fails to impose a legal duty to act.178  Therefore, Part IV 
proposes a model state statute that imposes a legal duty on online dating 
websites to perform criminal background checks on users, which will 
work together with a CDA amendment and allow a victim’s negligence 
claim to reach a jury.179  Part IV.A proposes a statute requiring dating 
websites to perform criminal background checks on users and notify 
users about a recommended date’s criminal history.180  Part IV.B explains 
the effects of implementing the proposed statute on victims and dating 
websites.181 
A. Proposed Model State Statute 
Specifically, a model state statute that requires online dating 
websites to perform criminal background checks could read as follows: 
Definitions as used in this act:182 
(a) “‘Internet dating service’ means a person or entity 
directly or indirectly in the business, for profit, of 
offering, promoting or providing access to dating, 
relationship, compatibility, matrimonial or social referral 
services principally on or through the Internet.”183 
(b) “‘Member’ means a customer, client or participant who 
submits to an Internet dating service information 
required to access the service for the purpose of engaging 
in dating, relationship, compatibility, matrimonial or 
social referral.”184 
                                                 
177 See supra note 98 (listing different proposed amendments to the CDA to remove 
website immunity from tort claims). 
178 See supra Part II.D.1 (demonstrating that a victim must prove a dating website’s duty 
to perform criminal background checks to succeed in a negligence claim against the 
website). 
179 See infra Part IV (suggesting that states enact a model statute that imposes a legal duty 
on online dating websites to perform criminal background checks on users). 
180 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a model state statute that imposes a duty on dating 
websites to perform criminal background checks and notify users of each recommended 
date’s criminal record). 
181 See infra Part IV.B (highlighting the benefits of enacting the proposed state statute). 
182 The definitions in this act are modeled or taken from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-170 (West, 
WestlawNext through L.2013, c. 84 and J.R. No. 9) (defining terms used in the New Jersey 
statute that requires online dating websites to notify users if the website performs criminal 
background checks). 
183 Id. § 56:8-170d. 
184 Id. § 56:8-170f. 
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(c) “‘Criminal background screening’ means a name search 
for a person’s criminal convictions initiated by an on-line 
dating service provider and conducted by one of the 
following means: 
(1) By searching available and regularly updated 
government public record databases for criminal 
convictions so long as such databases, in the 
aggregate, provide substantial national coverage; or 
(2) By searching a database maintained by a private 
vendor that is regularly updated and is maintained in 
the United States with substantial national coverage 
of criminal history records and sexual offender 
registries.”185 
(d) “‘Criminal conviction’ means a conviction for any crime 
including but not limited to any sex offense that would 
qualify the offender for registration pursuant to [insert 
applicable state statute] or under another jurisdiction’s 
equivalent statute.”186 
(e) “Violent offenses” means a conviction including but not 
limited to battery, assault, burglary, or robbery. 
(f) “Sex offenses” means a conviction including but not 
limited to rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, or 
stalking. 
(g) “Fraudulent offenses” means a conviction including but 
not limited to identity theft, embezzlement, or credit card 
fraud. 
(h) “Recommended match” means a member chosen as a 
potential date for another member by the Internet dating 
service based on each member’s dating profile.187 
 
An Internet dating service shall: 
(a) perform annual criminal background screenings on all 
members; 
(b) notify members of the criminal background screening 
results for each recommended match; 
(1) the notification of the criminal background screening 
results shall include: 
A. the number of convictions; 
B. the type of each conviction; and 
                                                 
185 Id. § 56:8-170a. 
186 Id. § 56:8-170h. 
187 The definitions for violent offenses, sex offenses, fraudulent offenses, and 
recommended match are the contribution of the author. 
O'Day: Rapists, Sexual Offenders, and Child Molesters:  Who is Your Roma
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
364 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
C. the date of each conviction for: 
i. all felony convictions; and 
ii. misdemeanor convictions involving 
1. violent offenses; 
2. sex offenses; and 
3. fraudulent offenses 
(2) the Internet dating service shall provide a member 
with the results at the same time the website 
recommends the match 
(c) allow members to choose not to receive any recommended 
matches with a prior criminal conviction.188 
B. Commentary 
The proposed statute affects both victims and dating websites and 
serves two policy interests.189  Part IV.B.1 demonstrates how the 
proposed statute improves user safety when using dating websites.190  
Part IV.B.2 explains how the proposed statute imposes a duty on dating 
websites and grants victims an opportunity to hold dating websites 
accountable for failing to perform criminal background checks.191 
1. Increasing User Safety on Dating Websites 
Requiring that dating websites perform criminal background checks 
and notify each user of a recommended date’s criminal history will 
increase user safety.192  With the proposed statute, dating websites will 
identify dangerous individuals who use the online dating service and 
users will become aware of their recommended dates’ criminal history.193  
As a result, dating websites may refuse to provide their services to 
dangerous individuals, or users may decide not to date dangerous 
individuals.  Opponents of mandatory criminal background checks 
mistakenly claim the checks will create a false sense of security among 
                                                 
188 The duties imposed on an internet dating service are the contribution of the author. 
189 See infra Parts IV.B.1–2 (explaining that state statutes should increase safety for users 
of online dating websites and establish a duty that allows victims to hold the websites 
accountable). 
190 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing how the proposed statute will further protect users). 
191 See infra Part IV.B.2 (examining how the proposed statute allows victims to hold 
dating websites accountable rather than allowing websites to escape liability). 
192 See supra Part II.A (discussing the dangers of online dating including attacks on users 
by their recommended dates). 
193 See supra notes 28–29 (explaining that online dating involves an unknown risk of 
whether a dater previously committed a violent or sexual offense). 
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users.194  However, dating websites may attach warnings stating criminal 
checks fail to catch all dangerous individuals along with recommended 
safety tips to prevent users from attaining a false sense of security.195  
Furthermore, the current safety procedures, recommending that users 
follow safety tips for online dating and notifying users whether the site 
performs criminal background checks, have failed to prevent dangerous 
individuals with prior convictions from attacking their dates.196    
In addition, opponents contend that requiring users to submit to a 
background check presents privacy issues.197  In order to submit to a 
criminal background check, users must provide additional information 
not required to join a dating website.198  Criminal background checks 
may require a person’s name, birthdate, social security number, and 
prior addresses for the previous seven years; whereas, dating websites 
require a person’s name, birthdate, address and sometimes credit card 
information if the website charges fees.199  By requiring background 
checks, these websites force users to provide a social security number 
and a lengthier home address history which arguably invades an 
individual’s privacy.200  However, the benefit of reducing, or even 
eliminating, attacks by dangerous users outweighs the cost of requiring 
users to provide additional personal information.201  Additionally, by 
only notifying users of a criminal conviction when the site recommends a 
potential date, users retain more privacy than if the dating website 
posted the users’ criminal conviction on the users’ profile page.202  In 
                                                 
194 See supra note 40 (describing that opponents believe providing background checks will 
create a false sense of security among users). 
195 See supra Part III.C.1 (arguing that dating websites may prevent a false sense of 
security among users by providing criminal background checks and safety notifications). 
196 See supra Part III.A (assessing the failure of current safety procedures to prevent 
attacks stemming from online dating). 
197 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (arguing that industry officials believe 
submitting to background checks will create privacy issues). 
198 Compare Part II.A (identifying the information users must provide to join a dating 
website), with Part II.E (discussing the information required to perform a criminal 
background check). 
199 Compare Part II.E (explaining the required information for a criminal background 
check), with Part II.A (providing an overview of the information required on online dating 
websites). 
200 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (recognizing the industry’s argument that 
background checks infringe on a user’s privacy). 
201 See supra Part III.C.1 (highlighting the safety benefits of requiring dating websites to 
perform criminal background checks). 
202 See Horcher, supra note 108, at 276 (proposing a federal statute that requires dating 
websites to place a notification on the user’s profile page indicating a prior felony or sex 
offense conviction).  This Note’s proposed statute grants users more privacy because the 
statute only requires dating websites to notify users of prior convictions when the website 
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addition to increasing user safety, the proposed statute grants victims an 
opportunity to hold a website accountable for its actions.203 
2. Allowing Users to Hold Dating Websites Accountable 
The proposed statute imposes on dating websites a legal duty to 
perform criminal background checks and notify users of their 
recommended date’s criminal history.204  The statute allows a victim to 
establish a dating website’s duty to perform criminal background checks 
and a website breaches that duty if it fails to perform criminal 
background checks.205  Thus, a victim capable of proving the cause in 
fact, proximate cause, and damages elements of a negligence claim 
stemming from a dating website’s failure to perform a criminal 
background check may bring their case to a jury, rather than face a court 
dismissal because the website has no duty to perform criminal 
background checks.206  Yet, to ultimately succeed against a dating 
website, Congress must enact an amendment to the CDA limiting 
immunity from negligence actions.207 
An amendment to the CDA should reduce the amount of immunity 
granted to websites from tort claims.  An amendment may propose a 
balancing test to weigh the harm caused and the extent to which the 
website caused the injury or may simply reduce immunity to claims 
involving copyright and defamation causes of action.208  This two-part 
solution will allow a victim attacked by her recommended online date to 
bring her claim to a jury, rather than having the claim summarily 
dismissed. 
                                                                                                             
recommends a potential match, rather than allowing all users to view the criminal 
conviction on the user’s profile page. 
203 See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing that the proposed statute presents victims with an 
opportunity to hold dating websites accountable for failing to perform criminal 
background checks). 
204 See supra text acccompanying note 188 (imposing on an internet dating service various 
duties that would notify a victim of a potential date’s criminal history); see also Part II.D.1 
(defining the legal duty required to prove a negligence claim). 
205 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of care standard 
and breach thereof in a negligence cause of action). 
206 See supra Part II.D (explaining the required elements in a negligence action and 
recognizing that a victim may prove multiple elements of the claim for a dating website’s 
failure to perform criminal background checks, but that a duty failed to exist under current 
legislation). 
207 See supra Part II.D.2 (examining CDA decisions granting broad immunity to websites 
from tort claims). 
208 See supra note 98 (listing—among other possible CDA amendments—a balancing test 
considering all the circumstances and a solution that would use the CDA only for 
copyright and defamation claims rather than tort claims). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The increase in social networking and online dating connects people 
that would never meet, but it also provides criminals with more access to 
possible victims.209  Currently, most online dating websites fail to 
perform criminal background checks on users, thus failing to protect 
users from someone with a criminal background.210  This allows online 
dating websites to recommend, as a potential match, a user with an 
extensive criminal background.  Unfortunately, when a user with a 
criminal background attacks his recommended date, the victim cannot 
recover from the online dating website for its failure to perform criminal 
background checks on its users.211 
An online dating website may escape liability by claiming immunity 
under the CDA or claiming no duty exists to perform criminal 
background checks.212  Therefore, although a victim may prove that the 
online dating website’s failure to perform a criminal background check 
was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the victim’s damages, a 
court will likely grant summary judgment against the victim when 
considering a claim of negligence.  Many commentators have proposed 
amendments to the CDA to remove immunity from tort claims for 
websites.213  Yet, an amendment to the CDA will not allow a victim to 
surpass summary judgment against an online dating website.  Therefore, 
this Note proposed a model state statute that requires online dating 
websites perform criminal background checks on users and notify users 
of their recommended dates’ results.  In addition, the proposed statute 
established a legal duty for online dating websites to perform criminal 
background checks, which will allow a victim to surpass summary 
judgment and bring her claim before a jury.214 
Returning to the story of Sam, a young woman attacked by her 
recommended date—with a criminal background—while using an online 
dating website; imagine if the online dating website had performed a 
criminal background check on Sam’s date and notified her of his prior 
convictions, rather than allowing Sam to believe she found the perfect 
match.  Under this scenario, the online dating website would warn Sam 
                                                 
209 See supra notes 28–29 (discussing criminal attacks resulting from online dating). 
210 See supra note 25 (recognizing that currently only True.com performs criminal 
background checks on users). 
211 See supra Part II.C (discussing the case law that grants websites immunity under the 
CDA). 
212 See supra notes 85, 91 (noting cases granting immunity to websites from tort claims). 
213 See supra note 98 (listing proposed solutions to change CDA immunity). 
214 See supra Part IV.A (proposing a model state statute requiring dating websites to 
perform criminal background checks). 
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of her recommended date’s criminal history, and Sam would likely 
decide not to date that user, which would have prevented her eventual 
rape and sexual assault. 
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